

# The Economy Decides the Turnout and Election Results

Giovanni Antonio Cossiga

Collegio sindaci Policlinico Umberto 1, Università Sapienza—ROMA, Rome, Italy

Email: g.cossiga@alice.it

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## Abstract

This article was written because it was prompted by French President Macron's decision to dissolve Parliament and call new elections in France. In essence, the decision is intended to be the answer to the question that, like many, I have asked myself: "what response will the French community give to the new vote, after the vote for the EU Parliament". The answer to the question is the following article in which the result is prefigured, according to three possible hypotheses. That is, first, a vote for the French legislative elections as a photocopy of that for the European Assembly. Second, there is a potential divergence between the two close votes of the French community. Finally, the third option, there would be a big difference between the two voting decisions. Discarding the unrealistic first hypothesis, attention focused on the second hypothesis, *i.e.* a vote different but not overwhelming compared to the results of the European vote. I repeat, the text was written before knowing the voting decisions in the legislative elections in France, except obviously taking note of the results of the first and second rounds of voting. The final result is not surprising and confirms that the communities decide on the basis of previous experience and the results of the government in office in terms of economic development. Well, the tone of the French economy, like that of Italy, marks a period of relative weakness. Does this explain the defeat of President Macron's party in the European elections? So how can we explain the gap between the two voting events? Can we suppose that voters are able to give weight, so to speak, both to the participation attributed in terms of economic development to both the EU and the metropolitan territory? We cannot exclude it, although the community anticipates the judgment on the quality of development, deciding in advance whether things in the economy are going well or badly. Now there is no doubt that at a metropolitan level, the community has a mass of first-hand information, from wages, spending, savings, investments, and so on. Information is not available on the topic of EU participation in the development of the individual countries that are part of it. Returning to the result in France, there is

no doubt about the reasons for the recovery of the President's party, linked to the limited but expanding development of France. While a certain freedom of vote and a less ideological evaluation can be seen for the European vote. Less credible are the ideological reasons that took Le Pen's right to make progress after the first round of the legislative elections in France for granted.

### **Keywords**

Social Rapports, Constant & Coordinated Development, Collectivity Voting, Inflation and Deflation, Italy, French

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## **1. Introduction**

The electorate appears capable—without apparent particular efforts or other difficulties—of expressing electoral results, which may also be different (but to what extent) depending on whether the decision concerns a single state or an entire continent, as in the case of the EUROPEAN UNION. In France, last June we voted in the elections for the European Parliament. There were only a handful of days left and again in France the voters are called to elect the Assemblée Nationale. The party of Macron, the President of the Republic, suffered an expected defeat in the round concerning Europe. In response, the president decided to dissolve the French Chamber. A decision that aims to change the electoral results which, in the round dedicated to Europe, saw the Ressemblent Nationale (RN) prevail against the government coalition. The far right of the French political spectrum against Macron's centrist and left-wing parties. Attempts by far-right parties to reach agreements with RN have failed. The context opens up on many possible outcomes, with President Macron's surprise decision to return to the polls to verify the opinion of the French electorate a second time. Would there therefore be a potential variability of political orientation in France? In the meantime, how can we somehow justify the behavior of the community in France, and therefore also elsewhere, if within a few days the discontinuity of the vote is ascertained. Why?

Before anything else, it must be confirmed beyond a doubt that the community, called upon to decide on the fate of a country, always shows that it has clear ideas. Not so much and not only in choosing candidates for political management. But to still follow the intellectual psychological scent of the potential of the economy. In other words, the democratic community (but also the community in non-democratic countries) follows the "scent of territorial development". It confirms good governments that present a certificate of good results in the economy while it disapproves of governments with weak performances.

By operating in this way, by choosing governments according to the proven ability to improve common well-being, a sort of prevailing values could be created in defining the community's judgment in matters of political management. That is, attributing to the leadership (even autocratic), a sort of reward for the reliable

performance of the economy. So, from the years of the Empire to 250 after Christ, the flourishing economy and the mild and rainy temperature of the Roman Empire reached its maximum splendor and maximum territorial extension. From the 300s A.C. the drought climate, the decline in harvests, the epidemics (see Antonine plague) were decisive for a progressive decline in the power of ancient Rome. In short, therefore the good conditions of the economy are traced back to the advantage of the incumbent leadership even if the basic reasons for success and failure in the economy depend only partly on the program of the incumbent government. On the other hand, how to justify the fall of the Soviet Empire, which had subjected its very survival to the competition between the capitalist management of the West and the communist management of the Russian Empire? It is understood that the fall was inevitable, given the performance of the two competitors.

So, would French President Macron's gamble make sense when, placed in the minority in the elections for the European Assembly, he dissolved the Assemblée Française and called new elections in France at the end of June 2024? We can admit that in the space of a few weeks the animus of the French community could change, for example restoring the majority to the government in office. Adventurism or evaluation? But let's move on to try to answer the question. Let's not go far but let's stay on the Italian peninsula. Well, Italy, with a Chinese-style leap, rose among the most economically advanced nations in the post-war period, but has suffered a drastic slowdown in performance since the year 2000. Not necessarily linked to the decline of the Christian party. The responsibility goes back to monetary and economic policy errors, which favored the persistence of inflation and then deflation in the peninsula (Brown, 2022). The consequence of the prolonged arrest of development in the country has been the great instability of governments that has occurred in the last twenty years, which is still the subject of political analysis today to remove not the causes of government instability but rather the procedures of politics. Having said this, how could we explain, considering the most recent results in political elections in recent years, the cyclical trend of electoral results in various national and European competitions? This is how we saw in Italy the right-wing party, Fratelli d'Italia (FdI), in the political elections of 25 September 2022 to jump to 28% of voters, after in the recent past the consensus did not exceed the fingers of one hand. It is not enough. It was the particularly surprising result (negative) for the "League party" in the legislative elections, and consequently the extent of FdI's success and, finally, 1 in 5 respondents declared themselves surprised by the PD's defeat. Regarding the League, in the 2019 political elections, the Northern League party had accumulated 34% of voters while in the political elections three years later the voters for this party had dropped to almost 9%.

Well, how can we explain such an intense variability of voters in the Italian political elections for the two right-wing parties? League and FdI, are yet another effect of Italian political instability and the uncertain possibility of correcting this apparent anomaly with institutional changes. It seems reasonable to believe that

government instability is a sign of the country's failure in terms of weak economic growth, which has lasted for over twenty years. We can therefore argue that the reduction in the time required for majority consensus change, now entrusted in Italy to right-wing parties, indicates the lack of trust or limited trust in government parties over time. Limited confidence that the programs competing on the right and left of the political spectrum can resolve the central theme of the weakness of the Italian cycle, so that the consensus of voters has fluctuated over the course of twenty years between center-left and center-right of political assets. Certainly not only in the hope of taking the path of the economic growth program but rather of a test rotation to see the results of the change in the field.

In the following pages, two non-contiguous voting episodes are compared, involving: Italy and France. For Italy, the comparison concerns the voting cycles for the 2019 general elections and the 2022 European elections. For France, the comparison concerns the elections held a few weeks apart for the 2024 European elections followed by the vote for the *Assemblée Nationale*, which undoubtedly arouse interest. Finally, the discussion concerns the voting declarations in Italy, which could be shaken by the relations of the right-wing Italian government with the president of the European Commission, appointed by the parliament with a left-wing majority.













## **2. Governments Do Not Have a Direct and Immediate Responsibility for the Development, Therefore Accepting or Favoring the Potentials That Are Predetermined**

As if to say that the community mostly follows and reacts accordingly to the issue of the economy. Therefore, it shows that it is able to adapt to even more sophisticated strategies such as that of giving limited trust in the short term and initiating the rotation of consensus to resolve the issue of weak performance. We have already said that the community is the first to perceive development trends and to activate consumption and investments if things have prospects or to reduce consumption and investments if the opposite is the case. Ergo, governments and leaderships are chosen on the assumption that they are the best at giving emphasis to the market. Otherwise, the communities are ready to withdraw consensus and change the bandwagon of expected development.

**Figure 1** compares the votes obtained by the main Italian political parties in the 2019 political elections and the 2022 European elections and highlights the change in the electorate that rewards the La Lega party in 2019 and the "FdI" in 2022, both right-wing parties of the political spectrum. As shown in **Figure 1**, "Lega" and "Fratelli d'Italia" are both right-wing parties. Yet, the electorate rewards Lega party with 34% in the 2019 political elections. In the 2022 European elections, the electorate transfers consensus to "FdI" up to 26%, that is, a party that in the 2019 elections had accumulated just 6.5% of the votes. "Lega" party drops to 8.9%.

As if to say that the community chooses as a majority and reacts as a consequence of the tone of the economy. Therefore, it shows that it is able to adapt to

even more sophisticated strategies such as that of giving limited trust in the short term and initiating the rotation of consensus to resolve the issue of weak performance. We have already said that the community is the first to perceive development trends and to activate consumption and investments if things have prospects or to reduce consumption and investments if the opposite is the case. Ergo, governments and leaderships are chosen on the assumption that they are the best at give emphasis to the market. Otherwise, the communities are ready to withdraw consensus and change the bandwagon of expected development. It is not enough.

Political elections in Italy 2019			European elections in Italy 2022		
	LEGA SALVINI PREMIER	34.33		FRATELLI D'ITALIA	26.0
	PARTITO DEMOCRATICO	22.69	 	PARTITO DEMOCRATICO	22.69
	MOVIMENTO 5 STELLE	17.07		MOVIMENTO5 STELLE	15.6
	FORZA ITALIA	8.79		FORZA ITALIA	8.5
	FRATELLI D'ITALIA	6.46		LEGA SALVINI PREMIER	8.9
	Vicepresidente senior	0.53	Calenda		7.7

Source: Italian newspapers of the period.

**Figure 1.** Distribution of votes in Italy in the 2019 political elections and the 2022 European elections.

We must reflect on the hypothesis that in the case of a prolonged lack of economic development, the selection of the parties competing for the leadership does not seem to follow a quality selection. In other words, the communities would not be able to choose the good government program. But not due to the inability of such large masses to select the good or bad program of the parties and government. In this case there would be a decline in the very importance of the communities. The reason could be quite simple. Human societies are naturally set on the optimal development path in the temporal and geographical context in which we live. Therefore, stating that governments and leaderships hold the key to the development of territories would not be accurate. The path of development is traced naturally by the forces of the laws of matter, which also apply to economic processes. According to this approach, leaderships, democratic or otherwise, would be the gatekeepers to maintain the direction of the development process rather than the captains of the development boat.

In short, the path of development for Humanity would already be written in the laws that guide the Universe and the tasks of the leadership would not have a real ability to select the development models. Models that would already be present in

the behavior of the communities, in relation to the conditions in the time and geography of the territory. Ergo, the line of development of the territories would not be the same for all the inhabitants of the planet but, as we can verify, different depending on the temporal and geographical conditions. In summary, we can say that communities do not seem able to ascertain the quality of leadership programs during elections, but they have the sensitivity to clarify during the political mandate whether the line of natural development is being followed or not. We have already said that communities have a particular instinct that allows them to understand well in advance whether the line of development is satisfactory or weak and uncertain. In other words, when the community's barometer shows good times, the sentiment of the government group in office remains equally positive. Otherwise, consensus wanes.

Nor does experience disavow this analysis between the community and choice at the ballot box. As seems attested by the limited or superficial attention in the choice of voters about the economic, social, and other programs presented by the politicians in the running. Precisely because decisions are made based on the past and the results that have been achieved by the economy. Consequently, faced with uncertain assessments on the quality of progress in the economic field, the wavering choice of communities arises in designating the political forces to which to entrust the task of directing society.

This **must also mean** that in concrete terms governments do not have a direct and immediate responsibility for the development potential of a territory but that their essential task is to favor the intimate development capacity of a territory, therefore accepting or favoring the potentials that are predetermined. Accepting, that is, that the task entrusted to the leadership would not have the constitutive character that is attributed to them, but rather a role of attention and guardianship so that the natural wave can be realized.

Thus reasoning, we come to the possible conclusion that the development potentials are not the same for all the different countries present in the territory but that these potentials can also be defined and delimited by government policies that are not synchronous with the ongoing development process. Ergo, the decline of development voices seems to depend on leaderships unsuitable for the role that impose contradictions between development lines and government programs. Still. The monetary anomalies that often represent an obstacle to the natural development of the economy cannot be generated by the country's natural development model. Consider both the model of natural development and monetary anomalies (deflation and inflation) are to be considered a manifestation of the laws that regulate matter and the Universe. Both the natural economic program and the limitations imposed by monetary anomalies have the same origin. But one plans development, the other, the monetary anomaly, slows it down. The latter, not as oppositions but as instruments (inflation and deflation) for returning to the path of ideal development (Cossiga, 2018).

It is reasonable that the economic choices that led to the onset of inflation or

deflation should be attributed to bad governments, with the result of blocking and slowing down the ritual natural process that follows a gradually rising trend line and with a limited inclination. It is therefore inevitable that in a scenario of inflation or deflation the responsibility is attributed to the government for the responsibility for having harnessed the path of progress.

At this point, we can ask ourselves what influence the accelerated development potential of a territory can have on a social level, given the global warming due to the abuse of fossil energy. Well, it is not the first time that an area has shown an accelerated pace of development which has continued for over years. In the case of China, the conditions (globalization) for an acceleration in the Central Asian area had occurred. The phenomenon of globalization, an extraordinary collaboration between the West and Asia driven by common interests, which continued until the change in economic conditions and social issues of the two areas aborted its remarkable success. Well, claiming that the communist market regime allowed the miracle appears completely inappropriate, because the unusual miracle was made possible not by a winning strategy but rather by the *de facto* and not preordained collaboration between the Western economy and China post-Mao. *Laissez-faire* markets at a global level and the non-intervention of leadership at a global level have left the field open for a better use of resources. Of course, the limit was imposed by the planet's resentment for the exceptional volume of development and pollutants in the area and then by the change in the balance of power between the West and China (Milanović & Lakner, 2013).

We must admit that China, a new player in the international arena, owes its singular projection to uncontrollable events that favored its exceptional rise. No, it wasn't a gift from Jupiter! The so-called globalization that favored the Middle Kingdom is the result of a set of co-integrated factors, of the openness to the markets of the Communist Republic, which played as the right decision to support the parable of a development that was not only unexpected, but also widespread. Given that all the main protagonists of world development participated in the development banquet, it was inevitable that the party had to end. First for the growing global warming, which does not tolerate further resentment of our planet. How then to explain the apparent contradiction between the planet, which is controlled by the forces of nature and is subject to degradation and, at the same time, appears capable of forcing the development of the economy, even if for a not recurrent period of globalization of the economy (Fagan, 2017).

An apparent contradiction between acceleration of growth and disjointed and contradictory development for the health of the Earth? We can argue that in the meantime there is no contradiction between even accelerated development and the health of the planet. In the sense that the development of human civilization is written in the DNA of human beings and there is no link between development and disease of the EARTH. Disease of the planet, which is linked to the abuse of fossil energy, neglecting other form of renewable energy, which is instead consistent with the natural development of humanity. Once again it is the selfishness

and desire for wealth of individuals, as well as of states and territories, which derails the development of humanity, while the reasonable and necessary change of energy, from fossil to renewable, counteracts to the antagonism between the path of development and the malaise of the planet. On the one hand, therefore, the stubborn will of the fossil energy producing territories which do not intend to cede the profit cow. On the other hand, the timidity and lack of willingness of black gold-buying countries to make huge financial commitments for renewable energy create an enigmatic knot between producers and buyers of oil and gas.

The prevalence to be assigned to the relationship between nature and humanity requires that, faced with the hesitation of sellers and buyers of fossil energy, the entire matter of energy change in the world be entrusted not to individual governments but to the UN and the continental unions. In particular, for countries lagging on the path to development, Africa above all, financial concessions for new energy are aimed at ensuring that the acceleration of development takes place based on new energies and not passively according to methodologies to be reconverted (Dozon, 2008).

We will return to the topic of new energies, underlining that fossil or renewable energies are always natural energies and the change that has become essential shows a new need that the disjointed development between territories and continents has highlighted. There is no contradiction between coordinated development at continental and global levels and potential damage to the planet's atmosphere. Indeed, the acceleration of the global development process is at a turning point. Because new energy implies growth potential that was impossible with the abuse of fossil energy. On the other hand, clean energy itself, not conflicting with the fate of the planet, leaves open the possibility of an acceleration of global development, which is necessary for the energy turning point and to invest in the knowledge and training of young people in the new, unpolluted horizon of the planet (Kissinger, 2022). In other words, the exchange between fossil energy and renewable energy breaks the encirclement between development and pollution. Instead, it opens up to the coexistence of accelerated development and a fall in Earth's pollution. In **Figure 2** we can observe the opposing course of fossil energy (oil and gas) and the new renewable energy at global level.

Therefore, it is not only a question of a change between the good of renewables and the evil of fossil energy. But to break the misalignment between disjointed development of territories and the expected acceleration of global development, between fragmented growth of territories and renewed coordination of the development of continents. Because we must move, together with the change in energy, to the new model of development no longer constrained by the evil of pollution but freed from the hitherto stringent ties with great prospects. In other words, the turning point in the creation and control of energy does not seem to be just a change in fossil or renewable materials, but also the passage from an era, the previous one marked by weakness and articulation in economic development plans, to a new one in economic matters driven by the decline in renewable energy prices


and the neutrality of new energy towards the planet. We can move from a period of disjointed growth to one of coordinated development. A new model of development necessary for the survival of humanity but also for a new and different acceleration consented by common development, to face the new opportunities offered by scientific and technological research, which requires the allocation of new and significant funding. To investigate the creation of low-cost renewable energy, for the drastic reduction of air pollution and global warming. How likely is all this? We have already said that the contrast between development and a sick planet does not exist and depends only on the level of our scientific and technological knowledge. Indeed, not only is there no contrast to the development of humanity but on the contrary the same rules of physical matter they are good guardians of the path of human life. The theme, therefore, is: how to follow the path of accelerating global development, which certainly cannot continue as a sort of championship on the successes or failures achieved by real territories and continents (Cossiga, 2023).

The logic of the championship and the winner in this race is wrong. Because we find ourselves entangled in the logic of global blockades and potential reactions. While it is essential that the network of universities and researchers has no limits of space and time but is a great network of collaboration and solidarity; Because it cannot be won an adversary that humanity itself has created with means and instruments of the past that have led to the current degeneration of the earth's atmosphere. A change of course on the path of global development with the aim of accelerating the pace is therefore inevitable. Why Let's start with China, which seems to be attracted by the logic of blockades. Objective to counter the position of the West. Well, China follows in the wake of the past and a resumption of the acceleration of development that has marked the previous decades. A wrong hypothesis. Now the trap of economic development in contrast with the state of the planet has been triggered. Only if it follows the turning point imposed by the change in the energy model is it possible for Asia and the rest of the world to resume the climb to economic success. For the United States, the thesis of the primacy of the West remains, although since the Second World War the same idea of dominance and guardian of the world has evolved and is now archived by time (Morse, 1783). Similar considerations concern Europe, which brings with it the innovation of the EU. But is not taking the essential step of attracting the African Union into a single organism (Africa & Europe Union) as well as the quick willingness to welcome into the continental Union also the countries of the Caucasus and the independent countries of Central Asia post-Soviet Empire (Cossiga, 2024).

All this to say that the continuation according to the model of the past leads to the annihilation of humanity's development potential. The open path is to accept the challenge for the recovery of air pollution and global warming. A viable path provided there is a turning point in the development models and relationships of humanity with the planet that welcomes us. Therefore, the very idea that the logic of the strongest prevails and that a future of warlike aggregations can be

recomposed on this logic of the past is an absurd retreat of time, which moreover conflicts with the objectives of development and the transition towards energy without slag (Diamandis & Kotler, 2014).

The time and cadence of change lies within the community. In the sense that it is always the communities that regulate the pendulum of time and express consensus or dissent towards the leaderships and governments that understand or not the need to listen the indications of the communities regarding the economy. Now since communities decide on the basis of the economy, we can argue that conflict and war impoverish the invader, who therefore suffers the progressive discontent of the population. Well, no government can remain in office against the will of its people (Gordon, 2016).



**Figure 2.** Gross available energie in area (U, E.—1990-2022).

### 3. The Different Votes Attributed to Macron's Center Party Are Previsibile?

The Russian Federation and Iran have already sealed their fate, as we may retain. I am not saying that democratic countries or those with elective regimes have the vocation to extend to all communities. In this regard, it should be remembered that the source of inspiration for communities always remains the performance of the economy. And it is this that directs the availability or unavailability towards the government leadership, without any close link between democratic regimes and the performance of the local economy. It can also be added that the significant voter apathy recorded in the recent European elections could also indicate a sort of disengagement that derives from the nationalistic position that the parties tend to take. In contrast with the open will of the masses at European level to emphasize the powers of the Union. An ambiguous position of the parties that is strengthening in some European countries such as in the France of the Lepenians. A phenomenon, which is also not immune in other countries of the Union, including Italy. This squinty behavior of politics within the individual EU states finds its

expression in the singular poverty of the political debate. A debate that seems to detach itself from the substantive issues of Europe and the world, and in particular from the fight against global warming, which is rightly at the forefront of political issues at a continental level. It might seem that way, but that's not how citizens believe. That is, that the question of the economy and the progress of the economic cycle are the prerogative of the States and that general questions for all humanity are reserved to the levels of the Union. This hypothesis is unlikely because the citizens of a State or Union express their consent or dissent based on the results of the economy. It is also to be believed that in the case of Europe, the consensus with the leadership and the parties that express it is always the result of the analysis of the performance or otherwise of the economy. That is to say that both at the level of States and at the level of the Union, the decisions that citizens make are in any case an interpersonal collegial evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages that individual states or the Union add to the development factor. In other words, the communities would seem to be able to quantify the contribution to the economic development result provided by the territory and therefore by belonging to a Union. It being understood, however, that communities are inclined to favor large territories and are instead against their fragmentation into smaller units (Cossiga, 2024).

So, we should not be surprised if the community's judgment can change not only in the space of years (the legislature) but even in the course of a few weeks, if the voting opportunities do not have the same objective. In other words, in France the European election ended with a clear regression of the government parties and a clear advance of the far-right party Le Pen. At the end of June 2024, the French are once again called to the polls, this time for the legislative elections always in France. Therefore, the French who voted for the European elections are now going to vote for the legislative assemblies. There may be differences in the expressions of vote or a sort of reply next June again in favor of Le Pen in France.

We are faced with a vote with different purposes regarding the territories affected by the votes. We can immediately exclude that we can expect a photocopy vote in the two different rounds. Because voters' assessments can be more or less different, although time is tight. Therefore, if instead of the photocopy trend of the two electoral events in France there were a different inclination of the voters, how could this bivalve behavior be justified? Since voters decide based on the performance of the local economy, we should come to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that the voter is able to give weight (so to speak) to the metropolitan territory. In addition to giving weight to the European Union in addition to the specific performance of the metropolitan territory. In any case, the freedom to vote, which is accentuated in voting for the Union Parliament, is restricted at a metropolitan level to the essential values in the choice of leadership, linked to daily life and the development potential of the country (Brander Carter, 1970).

It is reasonable. It should be remembered that communities show great openness and welcome towards the formation of supranational organisms, understood

as a tool for expanding borders. In other words, communities believe that large territories are a more promising stage for economic development. It follows that, always from the perspective of advantages or disadvantages for the economy, it must be believed that large territorial projections add a bonus to development potential. It could be argued that, in the case of France which returns to vote for the legislative assemblies, a photocopy vote in the two elections indicates a substantial indifference of the voters to the different perimeter of the elections in Europe and then in the metropolitan territory. Otherwise, a difference in the results between the two polls within close distance of each other could mean that voters expressed a different assessment regarding the weight that voters attach to the metropolitan territory and the Union Territory with respect to the quality of development and not only. In case of marked differences, it must be assumed that voters instead give a different and broad assessment of the importance on development at a metropolitan or continental level.

Therefore, the different vote attributed to Macron's center party, defeated in the European elections and recovering in the metropolitan legislative, are previsible? Or rather, they express a form of non-ideological criticism about the state and level of integration of European countries? It would be this anxiety that gives meaning to the clear recovery of the anti-Le Pen parties in the second round of the legislative elections in France. That one is a party clearly anti-European. This could mean that even in France the parties are losing their traditional ideological values to emphasize the issue of economic problems. The shift of voters to the right in France could be attributed to lower-than-expected economic results.


In any case, consider that the recovery of the center in the second legislative round in France seem confirm the importance for the community of economic issues, which in France are weak but expanding. That say, I'm not wrong in believing that the most sensible hypothesis among the three put forward could be the second, thus excluding the hypothesis of a similar electoral result in the two elections in France. And, slightly discarding the third possibility, which in any case cannot be ruled out because the excitement over the anodyne results of the first European stage could produce a sort of turnaround in the legislative elections in France. As in fact then occurred. It does not seem possible that the community will be able to quantify the gap in terms of economic performance compared to the size of the territory considered. (Europe and then France). In fact, we believe that communities have first-hand data to evaluate the state of the economy of a territory ahead of time, based on known data on prices, family income, savings, investments, and consumption. It is quite different and limited the state of information available daily regarding the additional advantage that belonging to a Union entails for individual participants. It would therefore not be direct information but an ideal value that considers the attraction towards large territories that is part of the community's DNA.

Well, how can we interpret the swing of the European vote towards the right-wing parties, again in France? The European vote, a sort of free exit for voters,

who somehow wanted to protest? May be. The recovery of the center parties in the second round of the legislative elections would be a fairer evaluation of the political values still in the economic field.

#### 4. Two Episodes in Comparison

The data on the legislative elections in France are now known. Based on these votes we can have some more light on the behavior of communities in expressing judgment on the political behavior of the leadership. However, the fact remains unequivocal that communities move by drawing inspiration for voting decisions from daily life and from the trend of income and expenditure (Milanović & Lakner, 2013). The most careful possible analysis of the inspiring facts of a community in deciding a position risk being more complex and other aspects come into play that go beyond the examination of daily life. That is to say that daily economic data remain decisive, but we cannot also exclude some semi romantic interest from the past or present conditions may interfere (Figure 3).




Source: Quotidiano la Repubblica Venerdì, 28 giugno 2024.

**Figure 3.** (A) The European parliament 2024-2029; (B) France: Results by national party in the European elections—2024-2029 (% votes).


Let us therefore try to examine a different situation, which in this case concerns Italy. It does not concern voting problems but rather the short-term evolution of consensus with the government in office. We have said that in the Peninsula for some years the consensus on the leadership may have in fact overcome the traditional distinction between right and left of the political spectrum. Not only due to

the variability of governments, which in the space of just over five years have swung from center-left to center-right.



Source: Journal “Corriere della Sera” 1.07.2024.

Figure 4. A—Parliamentary election in France 2024, second round—Official preliminary data from the Ministry of the Interior 1.07.2024.



Source: Journal “Repubblica” 08.07.2024.

Figure 5. Percent distribution of votes. Preliminary official results from the Ministry of Interior 08.07.24.

Well, the current center-right government in Italy seems to have been selected by voters more for the hope that it will bring Italy back on the path to sustained economic growth than for other ideological reasons. The recent elections for Europe confirmed the so-called Ursula majority (center left) thus excluding the right of the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists Party), which includes “Fratelli d’Italia”, President Meloni’s party. Inexorably I would say that in the top appointments in the European Union the center-left majority has excluded right-wing representatives from the negotiations for the appointment of Europe’s top personalities. I apologize for the details, but they are inevitable in trying to draw indications on the topic of behavior of European communities.

A controversy therefore arose over the exclusion of Italy in decisions on top appointments. In any way the European Parliament will have to confirm that decision. The question we ask ourselves “Will the controversy surrounding the exclusion of Italy from the circle of countries proposing top-level appointments have short-term consequences on the consensus that the relative majority party (“Fratelli d’Italia”) receives on the peninsula? In other words, do episodes like the one narrated, which have a different territorial perspective, have an influence on the consensus in Italy for the government parties or not?

Two episodes, the vote in France and the consensus on the government in Italy, which could be interpreted according to the same criterion. That is, no appreciable change compared to periodic surveys or a limited or wider gap in consensus. In the first case, due to the absence of some influence, the episodes relating to European institutions would not have an appreciable impact on metropolitan political issues. Otherwise, they interfere with some limits on the consensus panorama, which are however fluctuating in Italy. Or, third hypothesis, the oscillation of consensus in the short term is large and affects the fragmentation of the Italian political framework.

Also, in this episode the mobility of voters takes on an important meaning. Excluding the hypothesis of a strong earthquake in the consensus of the relative majority party in Italy, it will be important to verify whether in a short time there will be a measurable decline among citizens in favor of the government in office. The impression is that the decisions that the majority of a community makes are guided by the advantages or disadvantages that the level of development of the territory offers to families on a daily basis. However, it may not be as prevalent. It can be thought that the decisions adopted by the majority are partly influenced by events that enter the common knowledge of a population.

For a comparison of the results of the two elections, European and legislative, close together in France for a comparison of the data, we can observe that President Macron’s party presented itself at the European elections as Ensemble, then “Ensemble pour la République” in the first round of the legislative elections. The same occurred for the Front National (left) etc. (see [Figure 4](#) on Parliamentary election in France 2024 and [Figure 5](#)—Percent distribution of votes in France. Preliminary official results Ministry of Interior 08.07.24).

It is therefore not easy to monitor the shift that the French electorate has seen in the space of a few weeks. It remains certain that Le Pen's right did not obtain the desired result and remained with the values already expressed by voters at the European elections. While the president's party achieved a limited but not imperceptible improvement. Confirming a sensitivity among voters that goes beyond mere daily calculations on the topic of the economy. I would add that France seems to be following Italy with the slide to the right of the electorate not satisfied with the lackluster results of the French and Italian economies. As I was saying, not a vote of confidence but a vote of hope that the change in leadership can give new impetus to the economy in the two countries. A paradoxical attempt in France because Le Pen's party is anti-European, while a renewed vitality of the economy in the old continent is intricately linked to the constitution of the United States of Europe.

On the double vote of the French, it seems legitimate to argue that the voters have clear ideas on the scope and purpose of the vote in the two European and parliamentary sessions. The differences in the results, quite limited, would confirm the national tradition of the great history of France not overcome in part, despite the Europeanism of the president. Hence the gap of the two votes in sequence, with a certain freedom and escape to the right in the European elections and recovery of topicality in the vote for the French parliament. In addition, the share of development attributed to the participation of France in the future United States of Europe fades in the vote for the European elections. I would add that the partial disappointment of the peripheries in France on the issue of economic development is manifested in the European elections.

## 5. Conclusion

Let's leave aside the results of the elections in France which were held on Sunday 30 June in the first round and on 7 July in the second, because the issue of interest is certainly not the verification of a law of a trend; rather the potential evaluation of the factors at play in the electorate's decision. However, it is important to ascertain whether in the search for what pushes communities to give their consent to the management of the Economy or not, we can find (as is predictable) other reasons that lead to dissent and consent for the government in office. It seems that the original motivations that divided people between the right and left of the political spectrum in the past are perhaps in the process of traumatic decline. In the sense that it is difficult for a government in office, whatever its orientation in the democratic political spectrum, not to take as primary issues a more equitable distribution of wealth with some advantages for the poorest. And the care and training of young people, the theme of justice and individual freedom and so on (Oliver & Shapiro, 2006).

I don't mean to say that the formal differences between the classic poles of politics are almost evanescent, but that in a democratic area, both on the right and on the left of the political spectrum, the differences in political approach tend to

fade. So much so that the government's obligations can largely be shared by aligned political parties. It follows that public discussion between the parties often develops on issues that are almost marginal and perhaps not even achievable in the short term, so that fundamental issues such as global warming and the strategies that we all must use to reduce diseases on the planet evaporate. It seems right or at least acceptable that the richest families on the planet donate part of their wealth to research and studies to mitigate the negative shadow that envelops our planet. But let's not talk about it (Milanovich, 1998).

We also mentioned the hypothesis that economic growth is a natural factor implicit in economic systems. Therefore, the responsibility of governments for the outcome of development would not include the pressure of economic systems for development which is naturally ensured. Rather, it would be the task of the government leadership to guarantee "laissez-faire", control and eliminate obstacles to the natural development of the economic system. So, on the one hand, responsibilities are reduced and, on the other, tasks are channeled to give free rein to the growth of the economy. Obviously, this does not change the crux of the question that remains on the quality of development, for which the responsibility of the leaders in the field would be limited but no less binding, especially since they can be accused of having spread difficulties and obstacles to an already indicated path.

Well, this hypothesis of the natural destination for the development of human systems certainly does not change the behavior of communities that await "a tomorrow like today" and therefore a degradation of the systems is blamed on leadership. The expectation of a tomorrow at least similar to today confirms the hypothesis of systems in natural growth, which however require continuous adaptation of the status quo to the ongoing development process. In other words, it would be the task of the elites in office to create the social, structural, and civil conditions so that the ongoing development progress is feasible and acceptable. Which obviously involves the field of knowledge and its use.

This thesis is not surprising. That the line of development of economic systems is traced only means that the economy is regulated by some laws which, as for matter, protect the life of the universe and at the same time the life of human beings. The disharmony of development between the various territories and continents is not in conflict with this hypothesis, but only indicates that the starting points of regional development were different. But it also means that the current trend is not that of the divergence of the lines of development but on the contrary the progressive tendency towards the convergence of the lines of development between the continents. The process of convergence of development lines is necessary because we need the development of the global economy to accelerate because we are faced with great challenges before the others the threat of a planet that is too hot (Milanović & Lakner, 2013). We can only overcome this serious threat with research and science and allocate new resources to replace fossil energy. Objectives that require a different social level, a management of the economy extended to a continental level, and the support of supranational bodies and in

particular the UN (Cossiga, 2024).

## Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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