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Jünger's Anarch Provides a Practical Political Approach for Rand's Objectivist

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Abstract

Ernst Jünger's *Eumeswil* introduces the "anarch", a rational egoist properly concerned exclusively with pursuing self-interest. Ayn Rand's objectivist is also a rational egoist, but while Rand developed the ethics and economics of objectivism, she provided relatively little guidance regarding the politics and general relations with actual, non-ideal government. We present Jünger's notion of the anarch, connect it to Rand's objectivism, and argue that the anarch provides a practical political approach for the objectivist. Broadly, the anarch views some form of imperfect government as inevitable, endurable, and even useful to his pursuit of self-interest. Unlike the anarchist and partisan, who abandon self-interest and enslave themselves to particular ideological positions, the anarch is politically flexible and largely indifferent to government unless and until its interference with his fundamental right to pursue self-interest becomes intolerable. We believe this subject is particularly timely given the seemingly inescapable politicization of many aspects of modern life.

Keywords

Ernst Jünger, *Eumeswil*, Anarch, Ayn Rand, Objectivism, Rational Egoism

1. Introduction

Ernst Jünger (1895-1998) has been described as "one of the greatest German authors of the twentieth century" (Blok, 2017: p. 1). His political philosophy was shaped by his experiences in the first half of that century, including German military service in both World Wars I and II and the rise and fall of Nazism. His novel, *Eumeswil* (1980/1993) is as much a philosophical essay informed by those experiences as it is a work of fiction (Byrne, 1994). Jünger observed social chaos

similar to what many countries are experiencing today, and he identified a stable foundation on which the individual can erect and defend a position of integrity against the irrational mob (Berman, 2020). To that end, *Eumeswil* develops the archetype of the "anarch", a rational egoist whose ultimate loyalty is to himself (Shreffler, 1994) and "whose dispassionate stance allows him to serve any state without being corrupted by it" (O'Pecko, 1994: p. 132).

Ayn Rand's (1905-1982) philosophical system of "objectivism", which is also a form of rational egoism, or rational self-interest, was shaped by her experiences in Russia in the first quarter of the twentieth century, including the Russian Revolution and the rise of communism. Objectivism emphasizes "the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute" (Rand, 1992: pp. 1170-1171). Objectivism includes a philosophy of ethics and a philosophy of economics and naturally extends into politics, and yet it does not provide a well-developed political philosophy beyond how an ideal government should behave. For example, Rand asserted there can be no compromise on basic principles, moral issues, and matters of knowledge, truth, and rational conviction (Rand, 1967). A lack of compromise on subjective "moral issues", perspective-dependent "truth", and fallible "rational conviction" would result in constant strife between the objectivist and his real-world government. By contrast, Jünger rejected comprise only on the fundamental principle of man's right to pursue self-interest. Jünger's flexibility in dealing with imperfect reality is a far more practical approach. Rand advocated for capitalism, but that is a socioeconomic system largely independent of any particular form of government and may, in fact, work best in the absence of government. Rand's few sociopolitical positions (with regard to, e.g., taxes and abortion) suggest some form of libertarianism but she and many objectivists have expressly rejected that connection (Schwartz, 1988). In that light, we present Jünger's notion of the anarch, connect it to Rand's objectivism, and argue that the anarch provides a suitably practical political approach for the objectivist.

2. The Story

In Jünger's (1980/1993) story, the protagonist, Martin Venator, is almost thirty years old, has a pleasant character and an unobtrusive appearance, and is self-critical of his own irremediable imperfection. He is a night steward, a historian, and a self-professed anarch in the fictional North African city-state of Eumeswil. As a night steward he is able to see much of the current government while being largely unseen by it, and as a historian he is able to understand what he sees in a larger context, which informs his notion of what it means to be an anarch. "Politically, [he is] considered reliable if not especially committed" (p. 9).

"The Condor" is the tyrannical ruler of Eumeswil, having overthrown the prior regime. He is a middle-aged bachelor, an accomplished hunter, and charms everyone with friendly joviality. He is a tyrant and, at the same time, relatively likeable

and relatable, i.e., both bad and good, oppressive and useful, like all real persons and governments. Not liking the name "Martin", the Condor variously refers to Venator as Manuel, Manuelo, and Emanuelo. Venator's stoic acceptance of his ruler taking such liberty with something as personal as his name reflects his practical flexibility when dealing with others' actions that do not directly or significantly affect his self-interest.

Vigo, Venator's history professor and mentor, endorses neither the current nor the prior regimes: "Forms of government, for him, are like thin skins that keep scaling incessantly… He favors certain polities without committing himself to any, especially a current one" (p. 34). Venator recalls a story in which an explorer finds a dead city and, within it, an inscription: "At this table, a thousand kings have dined whose right eyes were blind and a thousand others whose left eyes were blind: They have all passed on and now they populate the graves and catacombs" (p. 25). This reflects the transience of all political power, regardless of its ideology. The historian judges the dead long after their power has faded, "when their triumphs and their victims, their grandeur and their infamy are forgotten" (p. 26). Of course, "[t]he loss of perfection can be felt only if perfection exists", and nothing is perfect-certainly nothing political-so there is never any real loss of anything important (p. 26). "Monarchies, oligarchies, dictatorships, tyranny as opposed to democracies, republics, the [mob], anarchy. The captain as opposed to the crew; the great leader as opposed to the collective. For insiders, …these antitheses are necessary yet also illusory" (pp. 28-29). Each of opposing ideologies cannot exist without the other, so devoting oneself to the triumph of a particular ideology is devoting oneself to the continued existence of its opposite, and therefore is a never-ending fool's game. This is reflected in Venator's desire not to "[get] caught between parties whose quarrels I find cumbersome and often repugnant" (pp. 166-167). Importantly, the less committed an individual is to any political ideology, the less such commitment can interfere with his pursuit of self-interest.

3. Jünger's Anarch

Jünger's anarch is properly exclusively concerned with pursuing self-interest. The anarch claims for himself and recognizes in others the individual's inherent and inalienable right to pursue and protect their own interests: "'Make thyself happy' is his basic law" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 192), "[k]now thyself" is his second commandment (p. 292). The anarch has a live-and-let-live approach to other individuals as well as to society and government. He tolerates them as necessary or, at least, inevitable evils so long as they do not interfere with his fundamental freedom. As much as possible, the anarch pursues self-interest under whatever rules and within whatever social framework he finds himself. The anarch defies superior forces—the state, society, and even the elements—by using them without submitting to them.

The anarch acts politically only in defense of his fundamental freedom, and if that is not threatened he goes about his life without regard to politics. The anarch

does not commit to or squander his energy on causes that have no relevance to his ability to pursue self-interest. The anarch remains unencumbered by political commitments and so remains open and potent under any government. "[The anarch] fights alone, as a free man, and would never dream of sacrificing himself to having one [imperfect government] supplant another and a new regime triumph over the old one" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 136). "The anarch wages his own wars, even when marching in rank and file" (p. 135), and martyrdom is certainly not in his interest. It is better to say that the anarch is free of conviction then that he lacks it. As Venator explained, "The special trait making me an anarch is that I live in a world which I ultimately do not take seriously. This increases my freedom; I serve as a temporary volunteer" (p. 111).

Much of Jünger's description of the anarch involves juxtaposing him with the anarchist. Broadly, the anarchist is committed to ideas and actions rather than himself, while "[t]he anarch sticks to facts, not ideas", and always acts with regard to self-interest (p. 113).

3.1. The Anarch Does Not Enslave Himself to an Ideology

The anarch does not waste his time or energy with ideology, while the anarchist ironically enslaves himself to it. Individuals can be exploited and enslaved by ideas as easily as by government or society (Jünger, 1983/1992), and by committing himself to an ideology, the anarchist "unavoidably recreates the structures of domination associated with the state structures he pretends to oppose" (Berman, 2020: pp. 25-26). The anarchist has a very pronounced sense of ideological rules, and by observing them he feels exempt from thinking and thereby loses control over himself (Jünger, 1980/1993). In contrast, the anarch avoids ideologies and the "extortions, distortions, and self-mutilations that make up political life" (Berman, 2020: pp. 25-26). He engages in independent thought and action in the pursuit of autonomy (Berman, 2020), and he never loses sight of his main concern, which is pursuing self-interest (Jünger, 1980/1993).

3.2. The Anarch Accepts the Inevitability of Government and the Usefulness of Ordered Society

The anarch accepts the inevitability of government, while the anarchist makes himself its enemy. "The anarchist, as the born foe of authority, will be destroyed by it after damaging it more or less" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 249). The anarchist compulsively seeks to overthrow government on principle, despite its usefulness. On the very rare occasion that he is successful in overthrowing the state, the anarchist merely achieves a temporary respite between the prior state and the next, and therefore really achieves nothing. In sum, the anarchist puts up with nothing, devotes himself to change, and is never satisfied with any system (Meyer, 1990/1992).

The anarch is the positive counterpart of the anarchist (Jünger, 1980/1993). The anarch does not seek to control, topple, or alter government, and he resigns him-

self only to the whirlwinds it generates. "That is what determines his conduct: He invests no emotional values" (p. 249). The anarch understands that the state is unavoidable, if not necessary, and no state is perfect, and so he does not waste his time moralizing against individuals or overthrowing states that do not threaten his fundamental right. The anarch is sovereign and behaves as a neutral power toward government and society. The anarch is not the adversary of the monarch but his antipode and equal, "the difference lies [only] in the clothing and the ceremonies" (Jünger, 1980/1993: pp. 43-45). The anarch is as sovereign as the monarch and also more free because he does not have the burden of ruling. "After all, the monarch wants to rule many, nay, all people; the anarch, only himself" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 43). In sum, the anarch puts up with much, devotes himself to himself, and is generally satisfied quietly working within the system to achieve his own ends; he makes no waves and, instead, unenthusiastically conforms (Meyer, 1990/1992). He is neutral toward authority and rebels against it only if it leaves him no other choice. Further, social existence is largely transactional and sufficiently to his benefit to be tolerated. For example, the modern physician, who is made possible by and is part of society, can be useful to the anarch and furthering self-interest (Jünger, 1983/1992). Of course, Jünger (1980/2013) also noted a danger in relying too much on the benefits provided by society: "When life and limb are threatened, an alarm call will summon the fire department and police. But the great danger is that man relies too heavily on this assistance and becomes helpless when it fails to materialize. Every comfort must be paid for" (p. 24). Thus, the anarch, though "more or less repulsed by state and society", understands that they can be useful to him and so accommodates himself to ordered society (p. 227).

3.3. The Anarch Accepts and Follows the Rules

The anarch accepts and unenthusiastically follows the rules, while the anarchist rejects them. The anarchist resembles a pedestrian who refuses to acknowledge the traffic rules and is promptly run down (Jünger, 1980/1993). The anarchist accepts no authority and devotes his life to rebelling against it rather than to furthering himself. The anarchist rages against the rules until he is thrust into an even more confining straitjacket. In contrast, the anarch knows the rules, has studied them, and goes along with them and "plays his own game within their framework" (p. 250), and is happier for it. However, while the anarch recognizes and follows the rules of government and society, self-discipline is the only kind of rule that truly suits him. Because the anarch accepts some authority and focuses on furthering himself, he is actually more free than the anarchist.

3.4. The Anarch Requires That the Goodness of Individuals Be Demonstrated

The anarch does not accept the fundamental goodness of man and ultimately requires that the actual goodness of individuals be demonstrated, while the anarchist

accepts man's fundamental goodness as axiomatic (Jünger, 1980/1993). Thus, the Anarch's Razor: The goodness of any individual can be initially assumed for superficial interactions, but must ultimately be demonstrated when significant consequences are at stake. According to Jünger, individual ethos, or character, is different from social morality, or customs. These can conflict with each other, and the further one leaves society behind, the more he becomes aware of his own character. This distinction is as between the clothed and the naked: "The uniform sustains only holes; the body, injuries" (p. 302). When we discard the facade of societal morality, we are left only with our own individual ethos exposed to critical examination. It is the individual's ethos that determines his goodness, not the degree to which he adheres to others' notions of morality.

3.5. The Anarch Is Not a Partisan

Just as the anarch is not an anarchist, he also is not a partisan. Venator asserted, "I have nothing to do with the partisans", the anarch wastes no effort on improving government or society, he endeavors only "to keep it at bay no matter what" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 145). The partisan lives within a social or national party structure, while the anarch lives outside of it. The partisan subjugates himself to the group, while the anarch refuses to relinquish his individual freedom. In practical terms, the partisan can shoot in only one direction or else risk hitting his fellows and harming his cause, while the anarch has no cause or fellows and so can shoot in any direction.

3.6. Violence Is the Ultimate Basis for Human Equality

Violence is the ultimate basis for human equality and the anarch's last resort for re-establishing his fundamental right to pursue self-interest. Jünger noted that humans are animals and that the inalienable recourse of any animal is to destroy whatever threatens it. Similarly, notwithstanding the convention of social hierarchy, "[human e]quality is based… on the possibility that anyone can kill anyone else" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 155), i.e., human equality is ultimately founded on the willingness and ability of a man to kill another who threatens his physical survival or fundamental right. As Venator noted, based on animal nature and informed by his experience with civil war,

> [human equality is] not in the ever-changing distribution of power and means, but in a constant: the fact that anyone can kill anyone else… The possibility of killing someone else is part of the potential of the anarch whom everyone carries around inside himself, though he is seldom aware of that possibility. It always slumbers in the underground even when two people exchange greetings in the street or avoid each other (p. 44).

Importantly, because the anarch is secure in the knowledge that he can kill-i.e., secure in the knowledge of his equality-it hardly matters whether he ever actually does (Jünger, 1980/1993). Venator noted of his ruler, the Condor: "Not only can

I kill him; I can also grant him amnesty. This is in my hands… My awareness of my equality is actually good for my work; I am free enough to perform it lightly and agreeably" (p. 45).

4. Rand's Objectivist

Peikoff (1989) summarized Rand's theory of objectivism as follows. Metaphysically, reality exists as an objective fact independent of our feelings, wishes, hopes, and fears. Epistemologically, reason is our only means of perceiving this reality, our only source of knowledge, our only guide to action, and our basic means of survival. Axiologically, each individual is an end in himself, not a means to the ends of others, and the pursuit of his own rational self-interest and his own happiness is his highest moral purpose. Socioeconomically, *laissez-faire* capitalism is the ideal system in which men deal with each through voluntary exchange for mutual benefit. Politically, government's only proper role is to protect individuals' fundamental rights. According to Rand (1964c/1961):

> [E]very living human being is an end in himself, not the means to the ends or the welfare of others-and, therefore, that man must live for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself nor sacrificing others to himself. To live for his own sake means that *the achievement of his own happiness is man's highest moral purpose* (p. 30).

4.1. Selfishness and Objectivism

Objectivism asserts that man is an end in himself and the primary beneficiary of his action should be himself (Branden, 1964/1962). Objectivism is characterized by "selfishness", which carries a negative connotation but is formally defined simply as concern with one's own interests (Rand, 1964a: p. vii). Importantly, objectivism advocates not for mere selfishness but for *rational* selfishness: The essence of moral existence is concern for one's *properly understood* self-interest. Neither self-interest nor happiness are found in unexamined desires or random whims; they are found and achieved with the guidance of rational principles and so are possible "only to a rational man, the man who desires nothing but rational goals, seeks nothing but rational values, and finds his joy in nothing but rational actions" (p. xi). In that light, Branden (1964/1962) asserted that, the selfishness or unselfishness of an action is determined objectively, not by the subjective feelings of the actor:

> Just as feelings are not a tool of cognition, so they are not a criterion in ethics… [I]f a man pursues a course of blind self-destruction, his feeling that he has something to gain by it does not establish his actions as [properly] selfish (pp. 68-69).

Acting contrary to reason is self-destructive, and self-destruction is not in man's self-interest. Genuine selfishness—i.e., genuine concern with discovering what is in one's self-interest, accepting responsibility for achieving it, refusing to

ever to betray it by acting irrationally, and remaining uncompromisingly steadfast in one's judgment, convictions, and values—"represents a profound moral achievement" (p. 70).

Colloquially, selfishness is generally thought of as acting in one's own interest to the detriment of others' interests. For the objectivist, however, this treats others only as means to his end and is therefore morally wrong when it is reasonably avoidable (Enright, 2014). "A rational man does not seek or desire any more or any less than his own effort can earn." (Rand, 1964b/1962: p. 60) Our goals must be achieved by our own effort, not the lives and efforts of others, so a rational person never pursues a goal that cannot be achieved by his own effort. Further, gain by one does not necessarily entail loss by another just as proper achievement by one does not necessarily come at the expense of those who have not achieved. According to Rand (1964c/1961):

> Human good does not require human sacrifices and cannot be achieved by the sacrifice of anyone to anyone… The rational interests of men do not clash…there is no conflict of interests among men who do not desire the unearned, who do not make sacrifices nor accept them, who deal with one another as traders, giving value for value (p. 34).

Importantly, "it is only rational to take others' interests into account when pursuing our own, since much of human life and the striving for human value revolve around our relationships with other people" (Enright, 2014: p. 42). As an aspect of this, the objectivist, like the anarch, recognizes that social relationships can be useful.

According to Rand (1964d/1963), "[c]oncern for the welfare of those one loves is a rational part of one's selfish interests" (p. 51). An action that a person takes for a loved one is not a sacrifice if it achieves that which is of personal and rational importance to the actor. For example, if a person spends a fortune to cure their partner of a grave illness, they do it as much for their own sake as their partner's. However, if they use the same money to save ten strangers rather than their partner, as altruistic ethics requires, then that would be for the strangers' sake alone. The only thing that distinguishes the partner from the ten strangers is the former's value and the latter's lack of value to the actor-so if saving the ten strangers is the *selfless* act, then saving their partner is the *selfish* act. However, we acknowledge some tension between Rand's notion that emotion is not a proper criterion for determining self-interest (Branden, 1964/1962), and her notion that another's emotional value to the self makes their welfare a proper matter of self-interest (Rand, 1964d/1963).

"What, then, should one properly grant to strangers? The generalized respect and good will which one should grant to a human being in the name of the potential value he represents-until and unless he forfeits it" (Rand, 1964d/1963: p. 53). Our only obligation toward others is to maintain a social system that leaves man free to achieve in accordance with his values. Man should not subordinate his life

to the welfare of others or sacrifice himself to their needs, and any help he gives them should be an exception, an act of supererogatory generosity, not a moral duty, and only the individual has the right to decide when or whether they wish to help others; society has no right in the matter whatsoever. It is only on the basis of rational selfishness that people can live together in a free, peaceful, prosperous, benevolent system.

4.2. Government

Rand broadly defined government as an institution with exclusive powers to enforce rules of social conduct within a specific jurisdiction (Rand, 1964i/1963). According to Rand (1964e/1963):

> [Because it recognizes the primacy of individual rights, t]he United States was the first moral society in history. All previous systems had regarded man as a sacrificial means to the ends of others, and society as an end in itself. The United States regarded man as an end in himself, and society as a means to the peaceful, orderly, voluntary co-existence of individuals. All previous systems had held that man's life belongs to society, that society can dispose of him in any way it pleases… The United States held that man's life is his by right… that society as such has no rights (p. 109).

"Men can derive enormous benefits from dealing with one another", and an ordered environment can greatly improve their chance of survival, enhance their quality of life, and facilitate their pursuit of self-interest (Rand, 1964i/1963: p. 125). However, in order to have a free, civilized society man must renounce the use of physical force and delegate to the government their right of physical self-defense for orderly, objective, and legally-defined enforcement, so that when one man deals with another it is through discussion, persuasion, and informed, voluntary, uncoerced agreement. Rand asserted:

> The use of physical force… cannot be left at the discretion of individual citizens. Peaceful coexistence is impossible if a man has to live under the constant threat of force to be unleashed against him by any of his neighbors at any moment… [T]he use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary decision of another… if physical force is to be barred from social relationships, men need an institution charged with the task of protecting their rights under an objective code of rules. This is the task of a government (p. 128).

Superficially, there may seem to be some conflict between Jünger's notion of violence as the ultimate basis for equality between individuals and Rand's notion that individuals must renounce violence in order to have a free and civilized society. However, we note that Jünger rejects violence as not in one's self-interest except as a last resort to protect one's fundamental right to pursue self-interest, such as against a rogue government, with which we think Rand would have agreed. Further, Rand did not outright reject all violence, she merely envisioned the indi-

vidual conditionally investing their natural right to violence in the government so that it may be more objectively applied in order to facilitate civilized society.

Given its monopoly on the use of physical force, government potentially is the most dangerous threat to individuals' rights (Rand, 1964e/1963). However, "[t]he only moral purpose of government is the protection of individual rights" (p. 109), including the rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness (Rand, 1964c/1961), so government, when acting legitimately, is the guarantor of individuals' rights, not a threat to them. In particular, Rand believed that without property rights, no other rights are effective. So, the proper purpose of government is to make social existence possible for men by protecting the benefits and combatting the evils that men otherwise cause to one another (Rand, 1964i/1963). More specifically, Rand's ideal government is limited to providing police to protect men from criminals, providing a military to protect men from foreign invaders, and providing a court system to settle disputes among men according to laws (p. 131).

There can be no compromise between freedom and an overreaching government, because to accept unlimited and arbitrary governance is to condemn oneself to gradual enslavement (Rand, 1964f/1962). Integrity consists of loyalty to rational principles, and compromise with an overreaching government is not a legitimate mutual concession but a betrayal of principles by the individual—"an act of moral treason"—involving doing not something one simply dislikes but something one knows to be evil (pp. 80-81). Thus, "[t]here can be no compromise on moral principles… In any compromise between good and evil, it is only evil that can profit" (p. 81). For example, the imposition of taxes by government on individuals is an improper initiation of force, so "[i]n a fully free society, taxation-or, to be exact, payment for governmental services-would be voluntary" (Rand, 1964h: p. 135). More specifically, Rand noted that "[s]ince the proper services of a government-the police, the armed forces, the law courts-are demonstrably needed by individual citizens and affect their interests directly, [rational] citizens would (and should) be willing to pay for such services, as they pay for insurance" (p. 135).

As an aside, while we understand and may even agree with Rand's point, we also find it strikingly naïve. In our opinion, a major problem with objectivism and, more generally, rational egoism is the demonstrably incorrect assumption that the vast majority of ordinary persons are sufficiently intelligent, informed, and otherwise capable of reliably behaving rationally.

5. Egoism, Moralism, and the "Sanction of the Victim"

In connecting Jünger's anarch to Rand's objectivist we must acknowledge and examine Jünger's negative view of the egoist: "Everything should be my business, but never My business. '*Fie on the egoist*.'… [N]othing is more important to Me than I" (Jünger, 1980/1993: pp. 327-328, emphasis added). According to Jünger, the difference between the owner of freedom and the egoist is the same as the difference between the anarch and the anarchist: The anarch owns his freedom

like property, while the egoist and the anarchist pursue it as a goal. Relatedly, "[t]he owner does not fight with the monarch; he integrates him", which further illustrates the difference between the anarch and the egoist (pp. 327-328).

Jünger expressly acknowledged Stirner's (1845/1907) *einziger*, or "only one". Stirner sometimes substituted *eigner*, or "owner", for *einziger* (Jünger, 1980/1993), and, as mentioned, Jünger characterized the anarch as the "owner" of their freedom. Like the anarch, "the only one is concealed in every person" (p. 329). Jünger characterized the axioms of the *einziger* as "[t]hat is not My business" and "nothing is more important than I" (p. 326). In arguing for egoism, Stirner (1845/1907) noted that we are supposed to sacrifice for so many causes-God, king, country, etc.-but each of these "is occupied only with itself, not with us, only with its good, not with ours" (p. 4). For example, God is an egoist: "He serves no higher person and satisfies only himself. His cause is a purely egoistic cause" (p. 4). According to the pontificators, "Only my cause is never to be my concern. 'Shame on the egoist who thinks only of himself!'" (p. 3) This is false: "Nothing is more to me than myself!" (p. 6), so rather than serving these egoists, become one and serve yourself (p. 5).

According to Jünger (1980/1993), "Stirner does not deal with ideas, especially those of universal happiness. He looks for the source of happiness, of power, property, divinity, within himself; he does not wish to serve anything" (p. 331). Further,

> [t]he owner does not fight for power, he recognizes it as his own, his property. He owns up to it, appropriates it, makes it his own. This process can be nonviolent… The owner does not fight with the monarch; he integrates him (p. 327).

The owner has rights over life and death: "He would kill and die not like the soldier for king and country, not like the anarchist for an idea, not like the martyr for a faith, but [, like the anarch,] only if his own cause demanded it" (p. 334).

In that light, we believe Jünger's general rejection of simple egoism is based on his understanding it as idea- and action-oriented and antigovernment, and therefore his rejection does not extend to rational egoism which is fact-oriented, practical, and accepting of a proper role for government. Jünger's general rejection of egoism is couched in a larger discussion of fighting against authority rather than using it or, at least, ignoring it. The objectivist would find no advantage in openly challenging authority unless, as with the anarch, it was truly necessary to defend his ability to pursue self-interest. Thus, we believe that Jünger's general rejection of egoism does not extend to rational egoism, and, in fact, the anarch clearly is a rational egoist.

We should also acknowledge and examine Jünger's position on moralism: "Attend to your own affairs; this is the only moral law" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 331). "[The anarch] has his ethos, but not morals. He recognizes lawfulness, but not law; he despises rules" (p. 209). The anarch is impartial and does not make unnecessary value judgments that would lead him astray from pursuing self-interest.

The anarch is "without moralisms or prejudices" because they do not advance self-interest (p. 169).

Rand (1964g/1962) expressly called for making moral judgments, and, as mentioned, not compromising on "moral issues", and so this could be seen as a significant distinction between the two approaches, but we think Jünger's anarch is both more faithful to the ideal of rational egoism and more practical for everyday life. We also fail to see how moralism or moralizing coheres with Rand's larger theme of individualism and selfishness. In fairness, Rand (1964g/1962) rejected both indiscriminate tolerance and indiscriminate condemnation as equal failures to fulfill the responsibility of making moral judgments. Nevertheless, we fail to see how morally judging others and refusing to compromise on moral issues further self-interest. We believe that, like the anarch, the real-world objectivist generally should be opposed to both moralism and moralizing and concerned only with what affects his ability to pursue self-interest. Having said that, it is not our position that anarchism and objectivism are identical in every respect, only that the former follows a more well-developed political philosophy that is suitable for use by the latter.

Relatedly, we note Rand's (1957) notion of the "sanction of the victim", which, in the present context, can be characterized as the willingness of good people to accept their own subjugation and thereby empower evil, oppressive government. According to Rand, evil is essentially impotent and survives only by the acceptance of the good, and the solution is to withdraw that consent and reject one's own victimization. Superficially, it may seem that the anarch's willingness to accept and work within imperfect government fits this notion. However, as we have argued, no government is perfect-they are all both good and evil, oppressive and useful-and the endless search for perfect government-railing against every perceived "evil," however slight or irrelevant-is the folly of the anarchist, not the pursuit of the rational egoist. The anarch recognizes one governmental evil, which is undue interference with the fundamental right to pursue self-interest, and never sanctions that.

6. Conclusion

Both Jünger and Rand developed similar, though certainly not identical, versions of rational egoism based, at least in part, on their early life experiences under oppressive authoritarian regimes. While Rand provided a larger body of work regarding the ethics and economic philosophies of objectivism, she provided relatively little practical guidance regarding the political philosophy. Like Jünger, Rand (1964c/1961) recognized the general usefulness of government and society in promoting the individual's self-interest in terms of life, liberty, property, and pursuit of happiness. The few sociopolitical positions Rand espoused suggest some form of libertarianism, but that is not clear and, in any event, she did not provide sufficient practical details to guide everyday relations with real and, therefore, imperfect government.

Jünger's anarch regards some form of imperfect government as inevitable and endurable, and even sees certain aspects of government and society (e.g., healthcare) as useful or even necessary to the individual's pursuit of self-interest. For the anarch, it is not in the individual's self-interest to engage with the government, whether to support it or to change it. The anarch is not anti-authoritarian and does not reject all authority at all costs, but rather recognizes its usefulness and reserves the right to examine it, but he ultimately does not really believe in it (Jünger, 1980/1993). Government is generally irrelevant to him, so he does not waste his time or energy on it. Regardless of how he may *feel* about particular policies, so long as the policies do not unduly interfere with his ability to pursue self-interest, he is indifferent to them. He is a political pragmatist, switching uniforms as needed to avoid notice: "If his milieu is water, he will move his fins; if it is air, he will spread his wings" (p. 280). He is neither for nor against the government, he merely recognizes it, like the weather, adjusts accordingly and unobtrusively goes about his business. He retains his freedom for himself, and however good or bad the regime may be he does not sacrifice his freedom to it. According to Jünger:

> Any man who swears allegiance to a political change is a fool, a [porter] for services that are not his business. The most rudimentary step toward freedom is to free oneself from all that. Basically each person senses it, and yet he keeps voting (p. 340).

No government is perfect; fortunately, no government lasts very long. "[T]he world-state both culminates and disintegrates overnight. The leviathan's limits are not so much spatial as temporal" (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 85). So, it makes no difference whatsoever to the anarch whether the country is ruled by tyrants or demagogues. In fact, distinguishing tyrant, despot, and demagogue can be difficult: "If the [tyrant] is overthrown by the [demagogue], little will change… Only the style will differ" (p. 185). For the anarch, little, if anything, is changed by the overthrow of one system for another, because "[the anarch] carries freedom inside [himself]… He does not pass through the regimes, they pass through him, barely leaving a trace" (Jünger, 1983/1992: p. 38). Regimes are as transient as the placards that refer to them-they come and go, but the wall they are hung on endures. Of course,

> [i]f [the anarch] remains free of being ruled, whether by sovereigns or by society, this does not mean that he refuses to serve in any way. In general, he serves no worse than anyone else, and sometimes even better… He only holds back from the pledge, the sacrifice, the ultimate devotion (Jünger, 1980/1993: p. 149).

The anarch, like the objectivist, renounces any bond or limitation on his fundamental freedom and rejects governmental and social compulsion as a basis for his actions. For example, the anarch rejects compulsory schooling, military conscription, and obligatory vaccination and insurance (Jünger, 1980/1993). How-

ever, to be clear, *it is the external compulsion, not the act itself, to which he objects*. The anarch does not refrain from acting in his self-interest merely to spite government or society, so his voluntary actions will often coincide with governmental or social requirements. For example, it is in his self-interest to be educated and to be healthy, and so he voluntarily participates in schooling and vaccination for that reason.

Thus, the anarch accepts governmental authority to the extent it facilitates his pursuit of self-interest by freeing him from certain mundane concerns, reserves the right to examine it to ensure that it continues to facilitate that pursuit, but does not commit himself to any particular authority because any of various forms of authority can serve the same purpose with regard to his pursuit of self-interest. In this regard, the anarch exists day-to-day as a so-called "gray man", or, as Jünger (1980/2013) put it, "a gray wolf hiding in the gray flock", avoiding attention and following the law so long as he is left sufficiently alone and actively avoiding conflict unless and until he is left with no other choice (p. 18). In that light, we believe Jünger's more developed political philosophy provides a suitably practical approach for Rand's objectivist with regard to his general, day-to-day relationship with an actual, imperfect, often overreaching but also often useful government.

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

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