

The Impacts of State Instability on Services Delivery in Post-Conflict South Sudan

Miyar Ezekiel De'Nyok

School of Business and Management, University of Juba, Juba, South Sudan

Email: mi.akurdit@gmail.com

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Abstract

The state fragility poses a causal consequentialism on the political will and commitment for good governance, capacity to reduce and mitigate poverty, and inclusive plan to innovate development and safeguard security. This study investigates the effects of state instability on service delivery in post-conflict South Sudan and intellectualizes the period of political transitions with a social concentration on recovery and reconstruction of the impaired social fabric and economic growth. It focuses on capacity function, political stability, governance, services, and public infrastructure facilities by contextualizing post-conflict transitory parameters. A total of 300 respondents were proportionately divided equally among Central Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Warrap States using stratified random method. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were deployed using questionnaires for primary data collection and literature reviews for secondary evidentiary data synchronization. Data was managed and analyzed using Statistical Packages for Social Sciences (SPSS) version (20.0). Cross tabulation was made to show the differences between beneficiaries and service providers concerning their demographics. Pearson's correlation statistical techniques were used to test and establish the existence or non-existence of relationships among the variables. Moreover, a multiple regression analysis was used to test the potential predictors of the dependent variables. Empirical statistics on the studied variables revealed low outcomes. These studied variables indicated respondents' dissatisfactions on capacity at 50 percent, stability transition at 64 percent, governance at 69 percent, and service delivery at 67 percent and infrastructural installations at 67 percent. The inferences were based on the data analysis outcomes, which primarily stipulated vulnerability to state instability, fragility, and low reciprocation of services delivery and innovation during post-conflict, and political transitions. The interpretative and empirical outcomes demonstrate deficiencies in institutional development and governance execution. The post-political transition arrangements were over-

shadowed by fragmentation and factionalization of state elites, leading to ethnographic conflict and polarizing South Sudanese and their ethnicities. This ethnographic conflict diminished the pursuit of social cohesion and resilience. The findings indicate policy gaps and implications resulting from the deficiency of service innovation. Therefore, the recommendations provide concise policies for delivering quality service addressing post-conflict and political transition predicaments to enhance socio-economic sustainability and development that leads to the suitability of democratic transformation. Further studies are needed for a modality of post-conflict political transition using bottom-up services-oriented delivery.

Keywords

State Fragility/Instability, Service Delivery & Innovation, Development Theories, Capacity, Governance, Political & Security Transitions, Socio-Economic Transitions, Public Infrastructural Facilities, Post-Conflict Case Studies

1. Thesis Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study

South Sudan has experienced protracted civil wars that have ravaged the country for three decades. The civil conflicts have destroyed socio-economic livelihoods, limiting service delivery and innovation and infrastructural development opportunities (World Bank, 2023). South Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. The CPA was expected to create and innovate opportunities for prosperity and state development projects, which were implemented in six years to observe and determine whether Southern Sudan should secede from Northern Sudan or remain in the United Sudan. The CPA also created the then Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to preside over its governance affairs with defined service delivery and innovation objectives (Spaulding et al., 2018).

Following South Sudan’s independence on 9th July 2011, South Sudan has become a nascent country in the East African region. However, the country has been engulfed by political upheavals since 2013, which threatens state stability and adversely affected the institutional tiers of the local, decentralized, and national Governments’ performance in delivering and innovating social services and public infrastructures installation (Badmus, 2017). To illustrate the transitional GoSS, the post-CPA blueprint plans were designated to create opportunities for service delivery and innovation. Unfortunately, GoSS had limited institutionalized socio-economic policies, human resources capacity, and installation of infrastructural facilities, leaving massive deficiencies in service delivery and innovation (World Bank, 2020). These barriers to service delivery and innovation have hindered the progress of economic, social, political, and environmental dimensions, creating weak transitory benchmarks (Yearbook of Islamic and Middle East, 2003).

The concept of service innovation transitioning is a burgeoning accelerated method deployed by post-conflict states to strengthen transformation and reforms through social, economic, and political stability. Reconstruction, recovery, and rehabilitation are the key to the restoration of peace, stability, and democratic institutions (Mahavarpour et al., 2023). The concept is highly regarded as the pathway to political stability and socio-economic development. Thus, what is service innovation exactly? Many Scholars have defined service innovations as “*the purposeful and organized search for changes and the systematic analysis of the opportunities such as change might offer for economic or social innovation*” (Witell et al., 2016). The Scholars’ argument is in tandem with the situation in which South Sudan finds itself in the post-conflict era. The Scholars illustrate that service innovation is a prerequisite for state stability, infrastructural development, and service delivery opportunities. For instance, the post-conflict South Sudan’s transitional period was associated with socio-economic prosperity and political transformation in terms of service delivery, institutionalized governance, social accountability, emboldened performance, and implementable Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Jain, 2020). However, the interim GoSS administration overlooked service delivery and innovation opportunities during the CPA interim period and in post-independent South Sudan (Rolandsen, 2015). The post-conflict has encountered challenges that would have been determined through the leverages of delivering services innovation and infrastructural development (World Bank, 2020). For instance, equipping human resources capital, strengthening revenue controls, emboldening social accountability, and weak political institutions would have minimized a deficit in service delivery and infrastructural development.

Furthermore, South Sudan’s population demography indicates that 63.9 percent of the population is under 24 years old. This young population comprises unemployed, unskilled youth with minimal capacity to deliver services. Thus, the shortfall in human capital capacities has added to the insufficient methods of service delivery and innovation (World Factbook, 2020). Thus, the consequences of the weak political transition continuously exacerbated state instability by hindering service delivery and innovation of infrastructural development. The political instability has delegitimized the existing Government’s performance in delivering, innovating services, and developing infrastructure facilities, making South Sudan the largest recipient of humanitarian assistance (World Bank, 2023).

More importantly, the OECD (2012) demonstrates that the essentiality of state stability is a key instrument for providing social services and infrastructural developments of state security, innovative development, and citizen accountability. However, OECD (2007) defines and asserts that “*states are fragile when state structures lack the political will and capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development, and safeguard the security and human rights of their populations*”. The OECD definition of the political fragility characterized South Sudan’s post-conflict transitory benchmark parameters from 2005-2011—CPA, 2013-2018—the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), and

2018 to date—the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). The unprecedented intervals of protracted civil wars have foreshadowed South Sudan's functionalism-structuralism service innovation and deliverability system. As a result, service innovations and infrastructural installations remain stagnantly affected by the prevalence of violence and displacement. For instance, inadequate human capital and weak institutional instrumentalism have delimited the capacity, authority, and legitimacy of delivering social services and public infrastructures (De'Nyok, 2023).

Notwithstanding, South Sudan's post-conflict transitions have inherited numerous dysfunctional challenges, such as building a stable state, empowering human resources capacity, and enforcing accountable good governance (Larson et al., 2013). These dysfunctional challenges have compounding complexities unattended by the principals in governance. So, the dividends of peace, such as socio-economic development and institutional empowerment, never exist or exist as isomorphic mimicry. Watkins (2012) stated that as of 2011–2013, healthcare is budgeted at 7 percent, education at 4 percent and security at 46 percent. The limited budget allocations to some essential services, such as healthcare and education, explain the low interest in building good public infrastructures. In addition, Ali (2014) defines state capacity “*as the ability of the state to act authoritatively to transfer the structural basis of the economy to achieve economic growth, reduce poverty, and income inequality.... or state ability to formulate, and implement strategies to achieve economic, political, and social goals*”. The scholastic argument of “state capacity” illustrates that the failure of a state to implement its deliverable measures are tantamount to state fragility. For instance, the limitation of allocating finances to fundamental services innovation, rather than security having the highest resource allocation, probably has had numerous consequences on South Sudan's stability and governance in the post-conflict transitions. The consequence has led to an increase in the macro-poverty level by 97.3 percent, emerging ethnographic conflicts, and cumulative malpractices in governance and accountability (World Bank, 2020).

In conclusion, the contemporary context and concept of delivering services and state stability in relation to post-conflict South Sudan's transitions depend on stability, capacity, governance, authority and legitimacy. For instance, South Sudan's institutional transitions have adopted isomorphic mimicry. The latter is a “*technique in which state governments successfully camouflage their persistent failure by adopting the visible forms of success without achieving functional success or the ability of organizations to sustain legitimacy through the imitation of the forms of modern institutions but without functionality*” (Larson et al., 2013). This institutional approach demonstrates that South Sudan has structures of governments without strong political transitions and functions. The institution has abdicated its functionality in delivering and innovating services by letting the other stakeholders implement the business of meeting the citizens' essential services.

Finally, state stability has significant linkages to service delivery and innovation that transform socio-economic development trajectories, political civility, social accountability and integrity, and environmental determinism. Therefore, having a comprehensive understanding of service delivery and innovation as the trajectory to post-conflict recovery is paramount to South Sudan's aspiration to embolden good governance and stabilize political fragility (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).

1.2. Statement of the Problem

South Sudan's services delivery and infrastructural installation remain unsatisfactory, as indicated by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) statistical index on poverty, education, child, and maternal mortality rate (Woodbridge, 2015; World Bank, 2023). These unsatisfactory performances and deficiencies in service innovation have been inherited from the failure of Sudan to build infrastructures such as roads and bridges, hospitals, schools, energy and water infrastructures; improve education and health services; uplift people from extreme poverty -which is the impact of poor socio-economic ineffective performance and productivity.

The statistics on health, education, infrastructural installations, water infrastructure, Information Communication Technology (ICT), and extreme poverty living standards in South Sudan paint a stark picture of urgent need. World Bank statistics have revealed that people in extreme poverty still live at \$1.25 a day; literacy levels are 84% in primary schools, 26% in secondary schools, and 2.5% in university enrolment. These statistics demonstrated that South Sudan still has the highest child mortality rate, with 104 per 1000 live births and 850 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, and life expectancy is at 55 (World Bank, 2024). These statistics describe the ineffectiveness of delivering innovative service as per the MDGs and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Woodbridge (2015) explained that South Sudan is one of the Least Developed Countries (LDC), and falls under the poverty human development index low measurable standards typology, with all other Sub-Saharan African countries falling. The MDGs' standard indicators have illustrated far below achievement in sub-Saharan African countries (Woodbridge, 2015). As South Sudan stands, its development compass is at a standstill in obtaining even the lowest percentile in performance and governance in service innovation and service delivery (MDGs, 2013). The under-performance in services innovation and infrastructural installations resulted from state instability and weak political transition (De'Nyok, 2023). The ubiquity of political instability in the transitioning state government has restricted the conceptualized services innovation and infrastructure development of the post-CPA and TGoNU premiership.

In 2005, CPA, South Sudan, earmarked a capacity-building strategy to engage and motivate workforces to establish and strengthen effective and efficient service innovation and infrastructural installations. This conceptualization of capacity building of human resources was earmarked as the main trajectory of transform-

ing socio-economic and institutional development (World Bank, 2023). Despite human resources capacity building and decentralization of governance introduced by GoSS to enhance service innovation and delivery in the post-conflict era, political instability has forced service innovation to remain at a standstill with the worst MDG indicators (Brinkerhoff, 2009). The MDGs measurable indicators revealed by the Sudan Household Survey (SHS) 2010 indicated that 97% of the population lived below world macro-extreme poverty, only 14% were literate, and the child mortality rate was at 105 per 1000 live births (Sudan House Survey, 2010). The statistics also demonstrate that education enrolment stands at about 1.3 million children in primary schools, but only 1.9% complete primary. Only 12% of the teachers are females, 27% of girls are enrolled in schools, and more than 90% of women are illiterate. 80% of the services delivered by NGOs and UN agencies in South Sudan have this educational disparity gap because of limited capacities and experiences.

Contextually, the unprecedented civil chaos in the country caused state instability and political transition mayhem, resulting in a meagre delivery of service innovation since the post-CPA 2005-2011 (Utz & Paolo, 2023). The civil instability in South Sudan was exacerbated by a political standoff, which adversely affected the innovation and deliverability of social services and infrastructure developments. To exemplify, the adversaries of civil instability have resulted in an inexorable and unprecedented increase of the macro-poverty rate from 51% to 82%, in 2009-2016 respectively, and 97.3% in 2020 increasingly—in which a majority live at \$1.9 per day, while about 4.5 million are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and over 383,000 died in 2013-2018 (LSHTM, 2018). Utz and Paolo (2023) justify the increase in poverty statistics due to instability, which denies accessibility and innovation of service delivery to the citizenry.

Consequently, South Sudan's service delivery and transformational innovation trajectories are inadvertently stagnated by state instability, thwarting a substantial institutional change, limiting foreseeable socio-economic prosperity, and hampering civility, subverting vital institutional governance's cultural ethics and poor public accountability and good governance. The protracted state instability propels non-functionalism-structuralism by deinstitutionalizing good governance in performing and operating service delivery and innovation (Larson et al., 2013). Therefore, the research explores how service innovation and deliverability would lead to transformational change by examining how service innovation could be the trajectory-driving factor in creating and re-enforcing stability and socio-economic resiliency in post-conflict South Sudan (Cathryn et al, 2022; Christmann, 2019).

1.3. Purpose of the Study

To investigate effects of services delivery as the trajectory driving factors in creating and re-enforcing state's political transition and stability, and socio-economic resiliency in post-conflict South Sudan.

2. Literature Review

The utilizes comprehensive literature review on secondary data such as peer review articles, websites and books. The study mainly reviews contextual historical background, demographic characteristics of South Sudan, development theories, post-conflict study cases, and factors determining service delivery and innovation.

2.1. Contextual Historical Background

The brief historical context of South Sudan highlighted the reflection on how state instability and weak political transitions became the blockages to service innovation, service delivery, and infrastructural development. These historical highlights captured the chronological history of South Sudan's fragility and political turmoil since the 1950s ([World Factbook, 2020](#)).

Historically, the people of South Sudan had been marginalized from the accessibility of the developmental state's social apparatus by the Arab elites during the colonial administration rules. The marginalization of South Sudanese by Arab epitomized the impediments, which caused the deficiency in service innovation, service delivery, and infrastructure installations ([Arop, 2012](#)). The impediments to services innovation and institutional capacity limitation ignited the South Sudanese citizens to revolt against the Arab regime to pursue fairness, accountability, and good governance. As a result, South Sudanese took arms in 1955 against the Khartoum Arab-led government before the independence of Sudan from the British colonial administration in 1956. Thus, this continuum of devastating civil wars implacably resulted in South Sudan being founded through liberation struggles that took almost four decades ([Fox, 2015](#)).

The first liberation struggle of the Anyanya I revolution occurred between 1955-1972, lasted 17 years, and led to the semi-autonomous region of Southern Sudan after the negotiated political settlement ([Arop, 2012: p. 35](#)). Anyanya I revolutionary liberation struggle objectively fought for the entire liberation of the southern regions. Although the negotiated political settlement granted Southern Sudan regional semi-autonomy, which lasted ten years; however, in the aftermath of the Addis Ababa negotiated political settlement, the independence of Southern Sudan did not materialize as strategized in the Anyanya's I revolutionary objective; ([Arop, 2012: p. 215](#)).

Despite the Addis Ababa Accord granting the Southern Sudan region's semi-autonomous independence, the Northern Sudanese centrifugal-ethnocentric Arab elites denied the need for institutional development, service innovation, and infrastructure development, which led to the dissatisfaction of many southern citizens. Because of Southern Sudanese dissatisfaction, the agreement was abrogated in 1982 by the then President of Sudan Jafaar Nimeiry ([Arop, 2012](#)). The abrogation of the Addis Ababa Accord triggered the second rebellion of Southern Sudanese from 1983 to 2005. This abrogation explicitly demonstrated that the Addis Ababa Accord did not result in the Khartoum Arab-elites desisting in their oppressive and orthodox practices of estrangement to southern citizens by denying

access to state developmental dividends socially, politically, and economically. Thus, the southern region was left in adverse conditions (Larson et al., 2013).

In 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) spearheaded the second liberation struggle. The SPLM conceptualized the idea of a united Sudan based on justice, equality, and freedom for democracy (Scott, 1985). However, in the episode of peace negotiation processes from 2002 to 2004, the negotiated agreement bore a new strategy protocol that allowed the Southern Sudan region to conduct a plebiscite to decide on the secession or to uphold the concession of having a secular and pluralistic system of governance in united Sudan (Arop, 2012). The plebiscite was conducted after six years of CPA lapsed, resulting in a referendum in 2011. The plebiscite outcome resulted in the independence of South Sudan when 98% of southern citizens at home and abroad voted for secession (de Vries & Schomerus, 2017).

In this essence, South Sudan seceded from Sudan on 9th July 2011, making her the newest state to join the world states membership as of "South Sudan-Northern Sudan boundary of 1st January 1956 alignment" (World Factbook, 2020). After gaining independence, the South Sudanese became very jubilant with high expectations in service delivery for the reconstruction of service innovation and rehabilitation of infrastructural development (Larson et al., 2013). The independence conceptualized the pillars that strengthen socio-economic prosperity and installation of good governance and public goods (Fukuyama, 2013). Instead, two years later, on 15th December 2013, the country again found itself thrown into the abyss of political turmoil through a power struggle within the ruling party of the SPLM. The power struggle embattlement resulted in ethnographic conflicts (World Factbook, 2020). This power struggle conflict also highly contributed to the limitation of innovative services and halting of infrastructure installations and increased the suffering of South Sudanese, in which high displacement occurred and paralysis of essential social services delivery to the needy across the entire country (Larson et al., 2013).

Therefore, contextually, South Sudan's chronological conflicts exacerbated the possibility of delivering social services in the socio-political transitions, economic developments, and infrastructure installations. This political fragility and instability thwarted the progress of implementing and innovating socio-economic resiliency and institutional development that feed the pillars of good governance (World Bank, 2023). The protracted civil war engagements restricted the country's institutional transition and human resources capacities. This means that the presence of the most robust institutional transitions and talented human resources capacities would have contributed to economic development, socio-political ethics, and environmental protection (World Bank, 2020; Gemechu, 2023). However, the state instability failed to achieve infrastructural installation and service innovation.

As demonstrated above, state stability is an equivalently vehicular instrument and prerequisite to service innovation and delivery and infrastructural installation

(Larson et al., 2013). However, contrarily, this argument concluded that the contextualized protracted civil wars resulted in state instability, thereby contributing disproportionately to weak political transitions by infringing the opportunities to develop strong governance bridges and cushions (de Veries & Schomerus, 2017).

2.2. Demographic Characteristics of South Sudan

After recuperating from protracted civil wars, South Sudan's independence was characterized by many impediments and weak political transition complexities. The country inherited a dwindling poorest socio-economic development rating after acquiring independence from its northern counterpart in 2011 (Awolich, 2017). Categorically, South Sudan is ranked as one of the least developed countries globally. Majorly, the majority of the people subsist from farming production, with 80 percent of the "population living in the rural areas" (World Factbook, 2020). Subsistence production is only a means to earn a meagre livelihood that unsatisfactorily improves the living standard for people living under abject poverty levels.

Although South Sudan supported its budget with 98 percent of oil revenues, this reliance on oil production has shortfalls and inadequately supplements the cost of innovating social services and infrastructure installations. The economy remains deficient in the gross domestic product (GDP) as presently affected by over 100 percent inflation of the hard currency rate (World Factbook, 2020). South Sudan's population is estimated to be over eleven million. This population structure is aggregated according to age structure, with percentages composing each age category as follows: 0 - 14 years (41.6%); 15 - 24 years (21.3%); 25 - 54 years (30.7%), 55 - 64 years (4%) and 65 years and over (2.5%) (World Factbook, 2020). With an aggregate total of 62.9 percent under 24 years old, it creates many job insecurities by increasing the high unemployment rate. Currently, the overall dependence rate is at 80.8 percent, with 74.7 percent youth dependence. Most young people under the age of 24 lack skill development and are incompetent to compete in country-wide exponential growth production (World Factbook, 2020).

2.3. Review of Development Theories

Development is a multi-dimensional process that involves major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, national institutions, economic growth, reduction of inequality, and eradication of absolute poverty (Ray, 2007). Literature scholars recorded numerous debates on the definitions of development theories regarding transitional post-conflict affected states. For instance, post-WW II development trends in the 1940s concentrated on socio-economic reconstruction and recovery and transitional institutions (Ray, 2007; Coccia, 2019). In relation to development trends, several scholars theorized post-conflict as achieving conflict resolution and settlement from a "protracted civil war" state through transitional governments, NGOs, and international institutions collaboration by stabilizing the po-

litical, economic, military, and social structures of the conflict downtrodden (Ray, 2007, Zambakari, 2018).

According to the recorded development theory discourses, scholars explored development trends that entailed the evolutionary and revolutionized civilization of humanity from extraordinary civility to post-conflict enraged states (Ray, 2007). Reyes (2001) argued that development theories gradually started with modernization, dependency, world systems, and globalization. These theories of development trends went through voluminous concepts of linear progress over time, which dominated geopolitical alliance and international multilateral relations regionally and globally. The authors explained that the “principle of development theoretical” framework revealed that development efforts that evolved in developing countries were the central cushion of industrialization and social infrastructure developments (Reyes, 2001).

The scholars emphasized that the aftermath of Post-WWII created world structural systems of socio-economic world order and political oligarchy. This oligarchical world structural and economic hegemony resulted in world economic block—capitalist and communist parties with differing development orthodoxy discourses (Vonyo & Klein, 2019). Thus, an evaluation of development theories such as modernization, world systems and globalization illustrated how the development discourses affect post-conflict transitions. These development theories are discussed in the next sections.

2.3.1. Modernization Development Trend

Reyes (2001) expounded that modernization started in the Post-WW II era, in which the United States of America emerged victorious as the global economic giant. The US became the super economic power to rebuild, reconstruct, and recover war-torn Western Europe by implementing the “Marshall Plan”. The author demonstrated that modernization aimed at bettering social and economic production by improving living standards, educating children, providing affordable health care, and increasing “functional capacity” through strengthened political hegemony and national institutions (Jacobs, 2022).

Jacobs (2022) asserted that structural modernization supported the egalitarian societies and political secularism in which equal distribution of resources and political participation exist. Coleman also supported the theory of modernization argument by illustrating that modernized political systems have a higher capacity, which enhances national identity, legitimacy, participation, and power-sharing. The modernization theory perspective also supported W. W. Rostow’s model of development of progress achieved through a linear spectrum of “stages of economic growth”, aiming to improve the standard of living conditions, including low-income families (Coccia, 2019).

Therefore, Rostow’s model of development theory is in tandem with the modernization theory. Modernization saw the introduction of industrialization and high-tech production in manufacturing processing plants. Although post-conflict states do not precisely follow the modernization theory, its evolution and revolu-

tionary effects have been catalyzed into the current development perspectives of neoclassical and neoliberal service innovations and infrastructural installations (Ray, 2007; Coccia, 2019). Thus, in the post-conflict South Sudan transition, modernization theory was imitated and propelled to introduce services innovation in modern systems of governance and service delivery standards. Unfortunately, they failed to materialize due to state instability.

2.3.2. World-System Development Trend

From the world-systems perspective, after Post-WW II, the development of economics and international geopolitics created two economic world systems of alliances based on vested economic interests (Coccia, 2019). These two economic blocks, such as capitalism and communism or socialist states, formalized the political-economic theory adopted by the contemporary world. Capitalism approaches utilized trade liberalizations and free market as a form of economic growth. In contrast, communism or socialist states utilized economic approaches in which a state institution dominated economic control rather than the citizens steering the market (Halperin, 2007). In this perspective, the author demonstrated that capitalism supported the idea of labour division while communism supported state control of resources.

Furthermore, in the 1970s, world systems shifted into controlling and treating the entire world “at least as a single capitalist economy” based on an international division of labour among its cores and peripheries. The division of labour created political systems that promoted strong “extensive bureaucracies and local bourgeoisie” (Halperin, 2007). The world-systems theory enabled the power of transnational classes and the global structural economy, causing dependency in relation to neocolonial industrialization in underdeveloped countries in the 1970s.

The world-system can only work in post-conflict states with a background of colonial administration that created resources through trusteeship on capacity-building and governance reconstitution, especially in the post-conflict of the developing and least-developed countries. Therefore, South Sudan’s post-conflict has benefited through multilateral financial resources support in capacity building and humanitarian relief assistance (World Bank, 2020). Humanitarian assistance and multilateral relations are the only way world systems fit into the post-conflict state. The humanitarian assistance and multilateral relations have strings attached to capitalist economic strategy. Hence, South Sudan absorbed and adapted to the world-system operational strategy and multilateral economic assistance in this regard.

2.3.3. Globalization Development Trend

“Globalization” is a unit of development theory that introduced regionalization and integration of nations with forces of international free-market interaction. Globalization trend led to post-development inline to post-conflict development initiatives (Pieterse & Giulianotti, 2009). The globalization theory has politically, economically, and socially created environmental connectivity and relativity of a

sense of global village through technology and mass communication. This environmental connectivity and relativity is a new way of dispensing transactional and virtual monetary mechanisms in terms of economics and trading in the free market interactions (Ray, 2007). Globalization and regionalization theory emphasize the main determinant factors that impact countries' socio-economic and political institutions emerging from post-conflict rebuilding. Globalization functioning objectives fit into the definition of post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation, and recovery through a regional collaboration by stabilizing states with international actors such as IMF, WB, UN, and NGOs in providing service innovations (World Bank, 2020).

Overall, in all three development trends (such as modernization, world systems, and globalization) many authors argued that development is a multidisciplinary social science that has transversely moved through the varieties of disciplines. In this case, development trends have evolved since the industrial age to globalized high-tech production and institutionalized geo-policy (Ray, 2007). This globalized high-tech production shaped the development trends, resulting in decentralization and free neoclassic market interactions. The theorists concluded that all post-conflict states went through the stages of Rostow's linear development model of economic growth (Jacobs, 2022). Arguably, the development trend has increased opportunities for the services delivery to the impoverished citizens deprived by protracted civil wars (Ray, 2007). These voluminous development opportunities include essential service delivery and infrastructural installations and are in tandem with post-conflict reconstruction, recovery, and rehabilitation.

2.3.4. Post-Conflict Case Studies

1) Post-World War II Western Europe

World War II (1945) had devastating effects on Western Europe's industrialization, materials, and equipment. The historiographical study of Post-WW II in Western Europe showed that 20 to 30 percent of industrial equipment and transport infrastructures (such as roads and railway hubs) were demolished due to war (Vonyo & Klein, 2019). The authors illustrated that World War II had dramatic effects on social civility and monetary inflation. Many civilians during WW II suffered as humanity was brought to a halt.

Nevertheless, the intervention of the US as the super economic power necessitated the rapid economic recovery in Western Europe in the post-conflict episode. War-torn Western Europe had previously institutionalized industrialization through a state-led development. The ultimate aims of industrialization were to modernize and create incomes and services for the communities. The institutionalized resources and industrial materials were erased by WW II conflict. However, the intervention of US in the post-conflict Western Europe assisted the recovery, reconstruction, and rehabilitation through the implementation of the Marshall Plan (Vonyo & Klein, 2019).

As the US redeveloped post-conflict Europe, Western Europe immediately abolished "command-economy-liberalization of prices and wages". The abolished

command-economy-liberalization promoted foreign trade fairs, with the US supplying hard currency—the dollar shortage in the Western Europe economy. Therefore, the availability of dollars boosted the importation of goods and services and foreign trade market interaction between the US and Western Europe. The US and Western Europe created a bond with a mutually inclusive economy and socio-geopolitical interdependent relations (Vonyo & Klein, 2019).

Purposefully, how did the reconstruction and recovery of Western Europe occur? At first, the US founded the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and later changed its name to the World Bank (WB). In addition, the founding of the “Marshall Plan—rebuilding Western Europe” was the main architectural principle of alliance that supported its cores and peripheries in alleviating the economic suffering of Western Europe in Post-WW II (Vonyo & Klein, 2019). The Marshall Plan provided dollarization aid to support the importation and exportation of goods and services, introduced trade liberalization, implemented public investment projects, and devised free market interaction. The Marshall Plan successfully achieved the economic development and socio-political transitions of Western Europe by suppressing communism. Communism was considered a centrist government and would have obstructed the foreign policy of the Western Europe alliance. By so doing, the US was able to gain control over Soviet expansionism (Vonyo & Klein, 2019).

Luckily, the Western Europe alliance countries were built economically, socially, politically, and industrially through the post-WWII US intervention plans. The Marshall Plan put Western Europe on the path of prosperity by building stability, capacity, and governance, which therefore ingrained functionalism-structuralism of service delivery; finally, the Western European countries were uplifted and developed inclusive economic institutions (Vonyo & Klein, 2019).

In conclusion, Western Europe had burgeoning development through industrialization before World War II. Therefore, the recovery and reconstruction were simple to meet because the civilization was already at its nascent. After having evaluated the intervention of the US through Marshall Plans to rebuild Western Europe, it was evidenced that the US intervention had loopholes that have created income inequalities and the emergence of social classes based on the principle of the leftist-capitalist economy. The Marshall Plan failed to address the economic recovery through bottom-up approaches; instead, it utilized top-down economic approaches that marginalized egalitarian principles while creating bureaucratic institutions and bourgeoisie social classes. This failure to address the income inequalities had also suppressed the low-income social classes to the farthest centers of governance and resource exploitation (Grosjean, 2019). Therefore, the Marshall Plan positively impacted post-WWII Western Europe’s service innovation and infrastructural installations. The international and humanitarian communities have supported post-conflict South Sudan transitions with similar contributions as the Marshall Plan did. The international and humanitarian communities established South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plans (SSHRP) to recover and lay strong

foundations of capacity, security stability, and infrastructural governance. However, these contributions have not been very effective and supportive since GoSS was reluctant to partner very well with development partners. Many projects were initiated but left at the hands of the humanitarian community, leaving the country’s service innovation capacity, stability, and governance to be run by humanitarian partners in development. The establishment of SSHRP projects should have been exploited by South Sudan’s post-conflict transition opportunities to build its economy and service innovation similar to how the Marshall Plan built Western Europe (Grosjean, 2019). The failure of the post-conflict South Sudan transition to exploit SSHRP remains a lesson learnt in the history of service innovation in the country.

2) Post-WW II: North and South Korea

The effect of post-WW II on the two Korean peninsulas had both prosperity and pessimism in terms of socio-economic and political setup in the South and North, respectively. In 1948, North Korea was established under the Soviet Union, while South Korea went with the USA capitalist union. Both North and South Korea were one country until post-WWII partitioned them based on the competition for economic systems of capitalism and communism (Editors, History.com, 2018).

North Korea introduced control of resource production through “collectivized (Juche-self-reliance): agricultural land, asserted ownership over private property, and controlled political and economic operations. This system of governance led to the isolation of North Korea from the international community. The system denied impartiality while establishing extractive economic institutions which marginalized the ordinary citizens and prospered the elite class in power (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). This marginalization of ordinary citizens created income inequalities and poor service innovations.

North Korea’s post-conflict service innovations had faced threats by the international community, resulting from the cold war between the Soviet Union that had controlled Eastern Blocks. The clashes of two ideologies capitalism and communism—had dramatic governance and economic development challenges in North Korea. The innovation and transitional governance in North Korea had gaps in terms of modelling world innovative and infrastructural installations (Editors, History.com, 2018). North Korean elites failed to envision service innovations prudently, and instead, they controlled the resources for kinship gains.

In contrast to North Korea, South Korea recovered from the stagnation because of the governance structure put in place. The transitioning of South Korea fell with the right ideology that had encouraged privatization of property and ownership, free trade, and market interaction. South Korea prioritized service innovations and infrastructural development by establishing inclusive economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). This participation of South Korea in the international community market interaction created innovativeness and production of goods and services.

For instance, the engagement of North Korea in Nuclear proliferation was a misplaced idea. This engagement hindered investment opportunities, the establishment of service innovations, and the focus on infrastructural development. Unfortunately, North Korea’s choice to establish extractive economic institutions created weak political transitions, resulting in low checks and balances in the governance arena (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). North Korea’s Post-World War II transitory benchmarks failed to be an effective development parameter, while South Korea’s transitory benchmarks induced prosperity by establishing inclusive economic institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). South Korea’s Post-World War II was transitioning positively in the development and service innovations simply because industrialization was taking shape at the earliest stages. However, the gaps in the literature indicated that both Koreas had no independent innovation and deliverability of services in creating public goods infrastructures; instead, they copied and pasted capitalism and communist systems.

With the evaluation of Koreans’ post-conflict transitions in establishing service innovation and infrastructural installation, similarly, South Sudan seems trapped like North Korea in developmental affairs with similar characteristics of extractive economic institutions. On the other hand, South Korea and Western Europe were able to recover from post-conflict by establishing inclusive economic institutions to better service innovation and delivery (Vonyo & Klein, 2019).

3) Review of Services Delivery and Innovation in Post-Conflict South Sudan

South Sudan service delivery and innovation conceptualization was under-exploited during the implementation of CPA. The CPA frameworks had envisioned service innovation strategies and plans that would have been interpreted as the breadbasket for the marginalized citizens denied services during the protracted civil wars (Larson et al., 2013). South Sudan’s present phenomenon is the result of a continuum series of conflicts that has destroyed socio-economic and political dimensions. This conflict continuum has dramatically affected stability, capacity, and governance (De’Nyok, 2023). As discussed early, isomorphic mimicry governance style exemplified and featured South Sudan’s ability to conceptualize service innovation and state stability in delivering services (Larson et al., 2013).

Contextually, South Sudan’s post-conflict transitions inherited numerous dysfunctional challenges, such as struggling to restore a stable state, developing human resources capacity, and establishing accountable good governance (Bregman 2021). The principals have limitedly addressed these dysfunctional impediments in governance, which created the barriers that have subverted peace dividends, such as socio-economic development and institutional empowerment. Ali (2014) argued that state capacity is the “*state ability to formulate and implement strategies to achieve economic, political and social goals.*” This definition of state capacity demonstrates that the failure of the state to deliver its measurable indicators always results in state fragility and negligible allocation of resources for service-delivery standards. The fragility and limitation of resource allocation to innovate and empower institutions undermined state stability, service innovation, and de-

liverability. For instance, South Sudan's post-conflict transition limitation of allocating financial resources to essential service innovations and physical infrastructures while allocating high financial resources to security has had drastic consequences in terms of state stability and governance. These consequences included an increasing macro-poverty level from 82 to 97.3 percent in 2016 and 2020, respectively, emerging of ethnographic conflicts, and routine malpractice in terms of governance and accountability (World Bank, 2020). All these consequences have affected service delivery and innovation.

Watkins (2012) stressed that South Sudan's "uncertainty" in basic services delivery was undermined by limited budget allocation of resources. The author stated that in 2011-2013 healthcare was budgeted at 7 percent, education at 4 percent while security received 46 percent. The undermining of fairly distributing financial resources demonstrates the abandonment of service innovations and the building of the public goods infrastructures. Shah (2005) also echoed the same argument of service innovation failure in Nigeria's post-independence transition. The author described Nigeria's poor service delivery on the eve of post-independence as failing to introduce proper service innovation and conceptualized development. Gafar argued that Nigeria's post-independent transition was marked by an impasse on service delivery, which resulted in an unprecedented lack of accountability, political instability, corruption, and bad governance.

The author further illustrated that the minimized resource allocations to support the delivery of primary service investments discouraged resource innovators from creating fortunes and prosperity at public institutions and increased pressure and provocation for state instability and socio-economic development. For example, Nigeria's poor service innovation was similar to South Sudan's service delivery impasses. To illustrate, South Sudan's transitioning institutions took a shallow interest in investing and developing infrastructures, building the capacities of human resources and empowering service institutions. This hesitancy of transitional institutions failing to prioritize service innovation typified and conceded failure in service delivery, state stability, and infrastructural installations (Hoeffler, 2019).

In this setting, the lack of service innovation in South Sudan has caused a prevalence of unprecedented civil instability and political cleavage. Delivering service innovation is also restricted by the engagement of South Sudanese in civil upheavals from 2013-to 2018 (Utz & Paolo, 2023). The 2013-2018 civil instability in South Sudan increased the political standoff, leading to adverse innovativeness and service delivery effects. For instance, the adversaries of civil instability led to an unavoidable and unprecedented increased poverty level rate from 51 percent to 82 percent from 2009 to 2016, respectively, and 97.3 percent from 2019 to 2020 (World Bank, 2020). This macro-poverty level increase has made the majority live at \$1.9 per day. At the same time, about 4.5 million are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Over 383,000 died from 2013 to 2018 due to this state's instability, service inaccessibility, and limited service delivery to citizens (LSHTM, 2018).

As a consequence of state instability, South Sudan's service delivery and innovation-based transformational trajectories remained stagnated while restricting robust institutional change, limiting socio-economic development, thwarting immutable civility, and suppressing good governance accountability (World Bank, 2020). This systemic failure in service innovation described the impact of inadvertent stagnation in propelling functionalism-structuralism forms of legitimate government, causing dysfunctional governance (Larson et al., 2013). Therefore, the contextualization of service innovation and state stability in the post-conflict political transitions and systemic service delivery failures have prevented the evolution of building the public goods and services and the establishment of solid political institutions (World Bank, 2024). The systemic service delivery failures contributed to the current suffering of citizens in South Sudan. The deliverability of poor social infrastructures in South Sudan is similar to the failure in service delivery, and innovation in Liberia's lesson learnt in its post-conflict institutional failure in delivering scalable public goods and services.

Oyelaran-Oyeyinka (2014) argued that service innovationists deliver services to improve socio-economic development and build public infrastructural facilities. The fulfillments of socio-economic development and installation of public infrastructures are the trails of providing satisfaction to the beneficiaries of service innovations. However, service delivery and innovation are highly dependent on financial resource allocations. Therefore, service delivery requires strengthening financial allocation and budgetary performance aligned to service innovation and delivery in order to improve service quality and enhance socio-economic development aligned with recipients' requirements and key stakeholders' directions (Hoeffler, 2019).

In contrast, the literature revealed that South Sudan had abdicated its service innovation obligations, leaving service delivery and innovation to the international and non-governmental partners. For instance, the MDGs and SDGs contended that service delivery is essential to achieving quality healthcare, affordable education, clean water, and sanitation, restoring infrastructure development, and enhancing environmental protection based on timeliness, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and assurance (Woodbridge, 2015). The MDGs and SDGs have inextricably intertwined service delivery and state stability goals. The intertwined inter-linkages impacted government service delivery and innovation on performing scalable standard services in the public sectors (MDGs, 2013).

In furtherance of service innovation transitioning, South Sudan's post-conflict transitions failed to envision coping mechanisms, propelling its core peace agreements' neo-classical economic growth and socio-political transitions. The perpetuated lack of strong political transitory parameters restricted the cushioning and realization of service innovation and state stability (De'Nyok, 2023). Ali (2014) argued that service innovation is the state's "*ability to formulate and implement*" socio-economic and political goals to achieve prosperity by eradicating poverty, reducing income inequalities, and establishing strong political transition pillars of

good governance. Ali's (2014) argument inferred that South Sudan's post-conflict resources governance failed to meet the threshold definition of service innovation. The failure in resources governance limited service delivery and innovation for public utilization. For instance, basic services such as healthcare, education, and physical infrastructures: electricity, road, and housing remain unsupported in the budget allocations (DeFeo, 2017).

Seemingly, the post-conflict South Sudan transitions have three challenges: stability, capacity, and governance. In addition, the lack of solid political transitions, the insufficient conceptualization of service innovation, and the implementation of poor service delivery and innovation impacted quality outcomes (World Bank, 2024). Demonstratively, South Sudan's human resources capacity has been flawed by a cocooning system of deploying expatriates through government consultancies, UN agencies and NGOs projects to deliver services under the shadowing of South Sudanese professionals. The system of cocooning deployment has diminished the skills of qualified South Sudanese who have experience equal to expatriates' equivalent qualifications (Ali, 2014). This capacity-building programme has remained passive since 2005.

The capacity building programmes earmarked as the main trajectory of transforming socio-economic and institutional development by training public service professional administrators and equipping them with technical and soft skills. The training of human resources would likely have produced scalable continuous quality improvement of services innovation and infrastructural development (World Bank, 2005). Overall, the contemporary concept of delivering services and state stability in post-conflict South Sudan's transition depends on stability, capacity, and governance. These determinant transitional factors affect service innovations and national infrastructure development (World Bank, 2024).

The determinant factors in delivering service innovation lie in solid political stability, talented human resources, and transparent governance (DeFeo, 2017). These prerequisites provide a functional and foundational basis for successful, achievable, and reciprocal service-delivery and infrastructural installations. Therefore, the significant and foundational pillars of service innovation, lies on political stability, capacity, governance, infrastructural facilities, and external partner engagements.

2.4. Conceptual Framework

Service delivery and innovation are the multiple parameters of institutional development, functional outcomes from good governance innovativeness, and customized political instruments in reestablishing post-conflict transitory benchmarks (Deng, 2011; Wassara, 2011). This Conceptual Framework provides an impetus for that conceptualized services innovation framework has the interrelationship that leads to building political transitions, state stability, capacity, and governance, for effective outcomes of national service innovations by explaining all the post-conflict transition nexus (as shown in Figure 1).




Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the study.

In the literature, the term *post-conflict* is referred to as the “period immediately after a conflict is over” (Frère & Wilen, 2015). Since the post-conflict period is after the civil wars, this implies that the reestablishment of any post-political transition must address the destruction, displacement, instability, and lawlessness. Therefore, the state instability requires state reestablishment through post-conflict transitory stabilization stages such as *storming*, *forming*, and *norming*, *governing*, and *delivering*. The interpretation of these stages simulates building the state from scratch to something. Stabilizing a state through post-conflict transitions has multiple quantifiable interconnectivity which is significant to building a productive, innovative and prosperous nation. Seemingly, a post-political transition requires a state to move away from *storming*—a period of conflict climax, *forming* a state, *governing* a state, and *delivering* service innovation to the state citizens (Wiesner et al., 2018; Hoeffler, 2019).

More importantly, state transition requires the instrument of stabilizing the security sector, building the capacity of human capital, financial and infrastructural resources, and re-establishing governance systems. Therefore, notwithstanding stabilizing security sectors and political transitions, stabilizing the state also includes the formation of a just and fruitful transition. The stability of the state to deliver its core functions and structures depends upon security sector reform, fair political transition, and shared responsibilities by the principal transitioning institutions during the peace agreement implementation period. Hence, stability is the most significant component of fruitful transition, smoothening and strengthening peace implementation. Stability is an essential variable in transitional arrangements because it is built through peace-building, reconciliation, and reestablishment of political transitions by forming three arms of government: The Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, to implement the agreement (Frère & Wilen, 2015).

After the reestablishment of calmness through security sector reform and political arrangements, the post-political transition requires strong capacity in human capital, financial resources, and material infrastructures. Without the most robust capacity in terms of human, finance, and infrastructure resources, it becomes challenging for the post-conflict transition to function and transit without barriers. Therefore, strong capacity must support the transition to delivering services and innovative capital for the state's infrastructural development and peace and stability (Nyaba, 2011). Many donors and state citizens are the prominent actors and contributors to a transitioning government during the transition.

3. Research Methodology

The study was carried out in three states: Central Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Warap States. These states were chosen to represent data samples for each of the three regions in Republic of South Sudan. The research design involves a case study and descriptive design enabled the researcher to capture the respondents' attitudes, behaviours and experiences regarding the phenomenon under study. The research utilized both Quantative and qualitative.

3.1. Sampling Procedure and Sample Size

The researcher deployed purposive sampling technique on service-providers, and simple random on beneficiaries to obtain a good representative sample. The sample size was calculated using the table of (Bukhari, 2021) for determining sample size and gave a practical ratio according to the population size. The researcher clustered the population to 300 service recipients of the site selected for studies. This clustered sample technique was in collaboration with Bukhari (2021), who asserted that if the population is above 10,000, then a sample of 100 is adequate. In this case, a sample of 300 was used for the entire population of 5,000,090. The selected sample size was intended to provide corresponding proportioned size needed for study.

3.2. Sources of Data and Description of Research Instruments

Data sources included both primary and secondary sources (Bukhari, 2021). The researcher gathered this data from the field through questionnaires from the various respondents selected from the service-providers and beneficiaries that receive the services. Secondary data were collected from printed materials such as books, reports and journals from reliable sources used to further justify and confirm data gathering from the field. The research instrument utilized questionnaires or focus group discussions. On the other hand, qualitative tools deployed in the research were necessary to arrive at conclusions about the relationships of the study. The qualitative approach assisted in concluding the observations and descriptions of the study, allowing the conclusion and policy recommendations to be based on the facts studied.

3.3. Measurement of Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments

To ensure the validity and reliability of the instrument, the researcher employed an expert judgment method. After composing the questionnaires, the researcher contacted experts in this area to review and ensure that the instruments were clear, relevant, and specific. Also, a pre-test was conducted in order to test and improve the reliability and validity of the instrument (Yusoff, 2019). Cronbach's Alpha test was employed to measure the reliability. Cronbach's alpha is a measure of internal consistency, that is, how closely related a set of items are as a group. The researcher used the Content validity index (C.V.I.) through Chi-square test to establish the validity of the questionnaire. C.V.I. is described as the degree in the elements of an evaluation instrument that is relevant to and representative of the targeted construct assessment (Yusoff, 2019). C.V.I. is measured as items rated 3 or 4 by both judges divided by the total number of items in the questionnaire. A C.V.I. of 0.7 is considered acceptable.

3.4. Statistical Analysis

The data was decoded, edited, and analyzed using descriptive analysis options of the Statistical Packages for Social Science (SPSS) version (20.0). Cross tabulation was used to show the differences between beneficiaries and service providers concerning their demographics. The descriptive approach utilized both qualitative and quantitative forms of data. The data was presented using Pearson's correlation statistical techniques, which were used to test and establish whether there was existence relationship among the variables. In contrast, multiple regression analysis was used to test the potential predictors of the dependent variable by analyzing variances.

4. Results and Discussion

4.1. Data Summaries

In each variable data summary, a brief overall interpretation provided to strengthen

and highlight the understanding of the study outcomes and how it had met the objectives. The inference of data analysis outcomes explained and delivered a broader understanding of the research outcomes deontological and consequential gaps, which are the deficiencies and impediments that need conclusive policy recommendations.

As the data displayed in the **Figure 2** the summarized respondents' queries on the capacity to deliver and innovate services in the context of South Sudan post-conflict performance through Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 and Agreement on the Conflict Resolution in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) revealed various deficiencies in services innovation. The collected, analyzed primary data examined knowledge and skills, competencies, innovation, timeliness, performance and engagement of individuals, and institutional infrastructures in terms of business processes and innovative applications in services innovation and delivery in the period of post-conflict implementations.




Figure 2. Capacity summary source: primary data.

The data summary in the graph above is interpreted with varying degrees of adverse and minimum positive outcomes. Thus, the interpretation of the overall average is quantitated as a combined average in three forms—strongly disagree/disagree, strongly agree/agree, and not sure as an independent scale. The combined average study indicated that 50 percent disagreed on possessing quality qualified human resources and institutional infrastructure capacities to deliver and innovate services in the Republic of South Sudan during the transitioning period, while 28 percent agreed on possessing qualified human resources and institutional infrastructures. The study also revealed that 22 percent have yet to have opinions or realize the availability of services innovation.

During the post-conflict period, the state-building and its establishment re-

quired a strategy that supported organizational functions and cultures structured on the capacity to deliver and innovate policy and legal framework, institutional development/management efficiency, sustainability, human resources, and public accountability. The organizational functions and culture must structurally emerge from the fortification of governance and socio-economic plans that require human resources knowledge and abilities to deliver and innovate services and improved institutional infrastructures that necessitate the efficiency and effectiveness of good governance and social accountability.

To correctly justify the outcomes of data under capacity in which 50 percent disapproved of service delivery and innovation quality, explain the inference of having a low capacity to deliver excellence in business processing and services efficiency management. However, 28 percent in support of the efficiency of services delivery shows the progress that needs to be built as the country gradually implements peace agreements in the transitions. In principle argument, the 2013 conflict has blanketed the development initiative for the rural community, which exactly comes out as 50 percent disapproval of services delivery.

Figure 3 reveals the summarized data under transitioning to stability in the post-conflict services innovation and delivery stage, vividly explaining the hurdle hindering excellence in delivering and innovating services and installing public goods infrastructures. The respondents indicated that 64 percent average of political, social, economic and security transition disapproved of post-conflict excellent transitions and 19 percent average of the respondents fairly support the performance of the transition government functions in innovating and delivering services.




Figure 3. Graph transitioning to stability summary (source: primary data).

In comparison, 17 percent, on average, have yet to have an opinion or no information on the availability of post-conflict services innovation. The low outcome of post-conflict transition is a true embodiment of the stagnation in engendering services delivery and infrastructural installation. This, therefore, can be inferred that the public goods infrastructure facilities need to be more comprehensive in the view of abdicating elements of good governance and utilization of public resources -socially, economically, politically, and technologically.

The abdication of the elements of good governance in resource utilization has its consequentialism that has reverted or slipped South Sudan into the unprecedented conflict. During the transitioning period, elements of development in terms of socio-economic opportunities, participatory governance, and installation of public infrastructures should have been prioritized. However, the lack of prioritization of smooth transition is presented by 32 percent; the inference of the result explicitly portrayed low parameters innovated or invented to incentivize the vital services innovation and institutional instrumentalism. The study has revealed enormous flaws and incompetence in implementing post-conflict services transitory dividends.

Figure 4 summarizes the outcome of variable governance interpretation from the respondents. The empirical statistics revealed low outcomes, explaining the unsatisfactory performance of the government. This low performance implied that rules of law, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and inclusiveness, responsiveness and social accountability have yet to be observed and applied in service delivery. Governance has a significant impact on service delivery. Therefore, the application of governance is a crucial variable in the innovation and delivery of public goods and services.




Figure 4. Graph governance summary (source: primary data).

Figure 5 shows the summarized data outcome on service delivery with three attributes: reliability, customer satisfaction, and availability, which encompasses how public administrators engage with customers—citizens, residents or enterprises when seeking and providing information while fulfilling their duties and social functions. These executions of services delivery are delivered based on practical, predictable, reliable, and customer-friendly.



Figure 5. Graph Service Delivery Summary (Primary data, Source).

The study indicated average of an average overall 67 percent of the respondents disapproved of the reliability, availability, and customer satisfaction, while 18 percent appreciated the delivered services. In comparison, 15 percent do not have an opinion on the reliability and availability of services. The study can infer that low services delivery has multifaceted variable factors that un-necessitate the innovation or the delivery of services to the recipients. These variable factors may be flawed in post-conflict transitory plans or designs.

Figure 6 explains the summarized performance and rating under infrastructural installations. The performance finding outcomes indicated inadequate responses with an overall low score for each category. The empirical implication is that low results from the respondents indicated a need for more service delivery and innovation. The low empirical outcome implied that service innovation is shorted from the delivery expectation during the reconstruction and recovery in the post-conflict transition.




Figure 6. Infrastructural installation summary.

4.2. Discussion

As service delivery becomes inevitable throughout the formation of state-building, institutional governance becomes equally paramount in dealing with the justification of delivering services to needy people. Therefore, rethinking infrastructure development will reduce conflict and enhance social cohesion resilience. Rethinking infrastructural development will also support a sustainable innovation process by building vibrant socio-economic, physical, institutional and governance infrastructures.

However, the study reveals that the development of public goods infrastructures has been discriminatorily affected and neglected. According to the findings, the empirical statistics on infrastructural installation still needs progress during the post-conflict era. The empirical findings indicate that roads and bridges scored 5%. This empirical approval put physical infrastructures such as roads into the challenge. For instance, road challenges result in limited interconnectedness and a need for more service delivery mobility in communities or states. This lack of interconnectedness causes rampant services delivery deficiencies in state services mobility.

The study results on physical infrastructures could have been higher. For instance, health facilities overall disapproval is 67% for school structures, roads and bridges, clean water facilities, electricity, and communication network reliability. These results signify the state instability's negative impact on services delivery. For instance, the majority of the State's facilities are being supported by Health Pooled Fund (HPF) by strengthening health service delivery, health system, and improved nutrition services (Belaid et al., 2020). The support provided by HPF strengthening essential health services and systems explicates the fragility of the health care system and its service delivery needs to be more extensive. As a result, the health system still needs to be more cohesive with limited funding support from the government. The literature reveals that from 2011 to 2013, healthcare was budgeted at 7% (Watkins, 2012). This negligible funding support from the government is tantamount to an entropic system.

As the 2013 crisis galvanized the country, health system service delivery was disproportionately affected and struggled to be supported by humanitarian health funds. The delimitation and pervasive continuation of the vicious cycle of the violent conflict through 2013 to date relative to peace reveals that state instability caused impairment to the fragile health system in the Republic of South Sudan. The inference from the study indicates that violent state conflict disproportionately limited the sustainability and development of the healthcare system technologically and scientifically (Sami et al., 2020).

Furthermore, the empirical evidence on education system infrastructure reveals that 4% of the respondents approved of the availability of resources and facilities. The study outcome is very insignificant to the current relative statistics on education ratios. Thus, the education service delivery is enormously impacted by the state's violent conflict. Therefore, this high disapproval of limited education facil-

ities explains state violence impacts on education, citing the challenges of education infrastructures. For instance, the peace agreement resulted in a significant increase in the number of out-of-school children, from 2.2 million in 2018 to 2.8 million in 2021.

However, 63% of teachers have no proper formal education (unqualified), only 500 classrooms built and rehabilitated, 2042 schools operate under trees, 1134 schools are temporary structures, 848 schools are semi-permanent, and this limited educational service is also demonstrated by 4 percent empirical outcome, which is also supported by the literature. The services delivery gaps indicate the long-term impact the war has had on human capital development, which has also specifically increased a drop in female child education enrolment. The authors, such as [Mayai \(2021\)](#) corresponded with the actual embedded argument result on the low outcome of the respondents in the empirical study. Thus, this impact has contextualized the current merged facilities education possessed in delivering and innovating its services through human capital and social capital.

Overall, the physical infrastructural installations have been insignificantly supported and contextually impacted by civil instability. The fragility of the state infrastructural developments is the causal impact of wars and limited governance and social accountability.

Nevertheless, the capacity to deliver services in the contextual fragile and post-conflict state is imperatively key in state-building. The functional capacity to deliver and innovate services lies in five foundational indicators: Policy and legal framework, institutional development and management efficiency, human capacity, public accountability, and institutional sustainability. These five functional indicators are imperative in delivering, developing, creating, and implementing a functional institution. For instance, to elaborate on each function:

- 1) Policy and legal framework assist in the function of good governance as a benchmark.
- 2) Institutional development provides the capacity to build the skills of professionals and systems to implement service delivery.
- 3) Human capacity provides human resources to do the tasks.
- 4) Public accountability provides social accountability for citizens.
- 5) Institutional sustainability has the capacity for resiliency in terms of long-term performance.

The human capital capacity to deliver services is encapsulated through capacity building utilized as an interventional tool or strategy by the donor community to rebuild human resources and social capital in the least developed countries with a fragile context of minimal capacity to deliver services responsibly. In reality, capacity building induces an enabling environment that allows the legal and political authority to incentivize institutional development. The argument exactly frames the importance of service innovation for the institution that has emerged from the violent conflict with the minimal capacity of good governance, socio-economic functions, and human capital.

Capacity building is explicitly defined as the fortification of key professionals' knowledge, abilities, skills and social behaviours tasked with improving institutional structures and processes to sustainably meet the organization's effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling its mission. The concept of capacity was surveyed as demonstrated by World Bank (2005) and Lempert (2015) that for the functional capacity of a state to recover and reconstruct from its fragility and cyclical violence, it is the responsibility of the ruling elites to ensure that the necessity to deliver services with quality is of high priority.

The study reveals that the context of services delivery in post-conflict South Sudan needs more verification benchmarks to equate the institutional capacity to the high-performance standard. The survey outcome clearly shows low results, with an overall approval rating of 28% from 286 respondents. The study surveyed key areas attributed to service innovation and delivery. These key areas included knowledge and skills, competencies, innovation (creativity), timeliness, performance and engagement. The respondents felt more needs to be done regarding the capacity to deliver services.

Arguably, if the context of a high-performing institution is applied in South Sudan the argument will be contextualized in three main pillars: Policy and legal framework; institutional development and sustainability; human capital and social accountability. As South Sudan emerged from the civil conflict in 2005 and was again galvanized by the 2013 violent conflict, the principal governors did not adeptly install a functional institution with the capacity to implement a viable and vibrant institution that has the agility, scalability, measurability, and smartness to performance. As vividly revealed by the survey, the persistence of dysfunctional institutions can be inferred as a lack of political will and policy functions. The context of capacity to service delivery are synonyms that remain complementary to institutional functions.

However, the deficiency in capacity remains in public debate whether South Sudan still has skilled labour shortages or a lack of functional institutions that ensures social accountability where policy practitioners and human resources are deployed when their qualifications match. This debate remains an assumption, although the survey revealed low results.

More importantly, for the existence of high-quality capacity of the human resources, an institution of learning must exist; during the survey, the stratified respondent revealed low scores in terms of higher learning achieved, such as Diplomas 8 percent, Bachelors, 25 percent, and Masters, 8 percent, and Certificate scored 38 percent. These results are the inference of the existing capacity South Sudan has developed. The question or assumption continues whether deploying human resources is proportionally observed or implemented in the workforce environment.

As the study disclosed issues of capacity deficiency in South Sudan, it is paramount to introduce innovative benchmark tools for supporting high-quality performance mirrored in the principles of proportionality, principality, predictability, possession, and policy balkanization. Applying these principles reduces the

gap experienced in the work taskforce environment. Each principle is adaptive and flexible to the individual capacity needed. For instance, these principles can be applied as follow:

1) The principle of proportionality is an intervention approach for delivering high-quality achievement by deploying specialized skilled professionals in the desired field of designation. This principle is adaptable and resilient to fairness and equity in human capital deployment.

2) The principle of principality is an intervention approach where policy practitioners are assigned to deliver services with blended social capital emphasizing public accountability; it induces high-quality performance because the elites are directly accountable to service recipients.

3) The principle of predictability is an intervention approach that utilizes SWOT analysis to predict or foretell where an institution will adjust its performance by foreseeing the capacity to deliver service from the *past-present-future paradigm*.

4) The principle of possession is an intervention for ownership and innovation, building from your skills and knowledge base from all the prevailing tasks.

5) The policy of balkanization principle is an interventional approach where legal frameworks are segregated according to institutional functions, the division of responsibilities based on arms of governance and individual specialization.

The discourse on South Sudan capacity building has been an ongoing subject. Many organizations, such as World Bank, IGAD, and HESPI, have conducted training for government policy practitioners in high-priority areas. As many organizations assessed South Sudan's capacity development and services delivery institutions, the rehabilitation of labour forces still demonstrates ineffectual performances.

In the context of transitional stability and security arrangement, South Sudan was marred by violent civil conflict which protracted for 21 years (1983-2005), leaving a devastated state, specifically in the South. After the mediation and negotiated political settlement, the conflict culminated in self-determination on July 9th 2011, through a referendum premise provided in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) accord between the South and North. The justification of the political settlement was based on marginalization, social injustice and inequities against the Southerners (Pringle, 2019).

However, the 2013 crisis galvanized the independent state, leading to the civil crisis. The state's violent conflict was settled through the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), which proposed power-sharing among the elites. For instance, Wassara (2011) contended that the political discourse on the right power-sharing was necessitated through consociationalism. The emphasis on consociationalism is that it is a form of a power-sharing agreement that applies the principle of a stable democratic system of governance in a polarized country by distinct religious, ethnic, racial, and regional segments, in which a power-sharing is split between elites from different social groups in a

politically agreed stable transition. As a result, the peace mediators proposed a consociationalism power-sharing method for the transitional arrangement as a fair method to the ethnographic conflict based on an ethnically polarized state. Consociationalism is a conflict resolution model many scholars recommended for ethnically polarized syndicates of tribal and political allegiances.

The literature reveals that R-ARCSS attainment in settling the post-transition stability had not met the benchmark for smooth transitional stability. The security arrangements and other particularities of R-ARCSS still need to be settled. The transitional arrangements are bogged down by the political factionalism and fragmentation of South Sudan's political elites. Factionalism and fragmentation had a causal impact on forming smooth transitory requirements.

Having provided a brief discussion on the transitional security and stability context of South Sudan, it is significant to contextualize the outcomes of the empirical and statistical findings from the study survey. The study indicates that security and stability transition have disturbing outcomes, with a high disapproval of 69 per cent overall. The study survey focused on political, social, economic and security transition as pillars associated with consociated power-sharing deals. The respondents probed responses scored high satisfaction for each transition indicator: political (66%), social (64%), economic (65%), and security (62%). These empirical statistics showed that security and stability were unaddressed during the transitional arrangement in the consociationalism power-sharing model.

The study has unearthed the unpredictability of implementing R-ARCSS. Therefore, the findings postulate that the fragility of delivering and innovating services could have been improved by more political stability and security arrangements. A secure and stable environment is necessary for the adequate delivery of services in the country. [Stimson \(2022\)](#) evaluation and assessment of political stability and security arrangement concluded that South Sudan has a long way to go to establish secure, stable, and safe political transitions. This evaluation and assessment of inadequate security and political transition supports the study's outcome. Thus, this implies that the South Sudan transitional arrangement needs much work.

More importantly, applying sound governance principles becomes crucial as South Sudan's government goes through transitional governance arrangements. Government and governance are interchangeably utilized for critical decision-making related to political and socio-economic processes. The emphasis on governance principles is a pathway to creating a legitimate government and adhering to the democratic and social justice system. The pathway can demonstrate that public governance is paramount in governing a state, specifically in implementing transitional legislation and peace accords. The argument regards governance principles such as the rule of law and public administration as an entwined anchor of governing the state.

For instance, governance theorists also argue that government and governance are synonymously utilized in various decision-making processes. Governance im-

plications imply the multifaceted key stakeholders' involvement in decision-making and processes (Asaduzzaman & Virtenan, 2022). The theorists also differentiate that government means the actors involved in decision-making, while governance refers to the decision-making process.

After briefly discussing the concept of governance, it is essential to contextualize the concept of governance in South Sudan's transitional arrangements. South Sudan's transitional arrangements have had numerous challenges, including governance arrangements, local security dynamics, and economic and communal relations. These challenges undermined the forming of a strong, peaceful, and reconcilable government. The challenges have underpinned governance principles such as rule of law, responsiveness, public accountability, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and inclusiveness, and transparency.

The study exhibited low empirical statistics on the achievement and implementation of governance principles in the current transitional arrangements, from 14 percent approval to 69 percent disapproval, respectively. The study surveyed governance principles related to the performance of transitional government in the current R-ARCSS. The respondents' responses to each principle include rule of law, effectiveness and efficiency, equity and inclusiveness, responsiveness, and social accountability (public accountability). The Respondents' responses to the principles of governance reveal severely discouraging results. These outcomes demonstrate that R-ARCSS transitional arrangements must have noticed the strict adherence to governance principles.

In relation to low empirical outcomes on governance, the implementation of service delivery and innovation becomes diminished for the national transitional government. These facts point out the need for the incorporation of governance principles into services delivery, which also encourages barriers in the deliberation and legitimacy of dealing with challenges facing the citizens. Scholars argue that South Sudan's current system of transitional arrangements has hurdles underpinning the strengths of R-ARCSS. Hurdles such as the constitutional making process, security arrangements, and an appropriate system of governance. Endogenous political fragmentations, polarized ethnicities, and communal conflict are the contributors to the dysfunctional capacity to deliver service and continue to instigate violent state conflict (Krause, 2019).

The study's low empirical findings on governance implies that respondents revealed concerns about services delivery in post-conflict transitional arrangements. Therefore, the study outcomes denoted the contemporary challenges of deinstitutionalizing the current transitional power-sharing arrangements. The inference is that the impact of state instability is correlated to the limitation of providing service delivery to the citizens. The implication of not applying the principle of governance drastically demotes social, political, economic, and environmental dividends of peace.

In conclusion, delivering services and building public infrastructural facilities require reliability, availability of services, and client satisfaction. The study indi-

cates that reliability, availability, and client satisfaction deeply expose service delivery as an area of failure. The study reveals that service delivery scored 67 percent disapproval as an overall reliability, availability, and client satisfaction compared to 18 percent approval.

Specifically, the argument on demand for services will increase with South Sudan's population projection. Contextually, South Sudan's services delivery shows a lack of investment in skills-building programmes for youth, possibly leading to political and social disturbance and an upsurge in conflict. Indeed, a lack of investment in capacity development, governance, and social and physical infrastructures has dramatically resulted in state violence and a disservice to the provision of services innovation. The empirical statistics on services delivery exposes the limitation and impaired challenges R-ARCSS faces in delivering its governance arrangements and building public goods and services.

Finally, the discussion elaborates on the empirical statistics on service delivery and innovation. The concept of service delivery implies a practice that promotes social welfare and development, social cohesion, and the empowerment of the liberated people, which upholds their socio-economic development. For example, some scholars define *services delivery* as the purposeful and organized search for changes and the systematic analysis of the opportunities such as change might offer for economic or social innovation—the theorists' argument link service innovation to development as complementary to each other. The argument from the scholars elaborates that service delivery is the process of achieving and improving the welfare of impoverished citizens, whether in the context of least developed states or fragile states. Therefore, the argument on service delivery and development can be concluded as demonstrated by the definition of development. *Development* is a multi-dimensional process that involves significant changes in social structures, popular attitudes, national institutions, economic growth, reduction of inequality, and eradication of absolute poverty.

Nonetheless, a scholar such as Schumpeter, the founder of the innovation theory of economy, emphasizes that innovation has an economic impact on technological change, which combines new forces to solve human problems (Bayar, 2016). *Innovation theory* is a concept that has been introduced previously in which existing literature points out that innovation is the mother of invention, process, change and result. Intuitively, the applicability of services delivery and development in a post-conflict state is highly applauded. The theory of development and conflict suggests that development aims to repair the destruction caused by the conflict through social change. Thus, social change is achieved through service innovation as the core foundational development method. For instance, the development discourse demonstrated that during Post-WW II in the 1940s, a concentration on socio-economic reconstruction and recovery and transitional institutions was achieved due to service delivery.

In addition, as detailed in Chapter II, several scholars echo the development discourse on post-conflict as achieving conflict resolution and settlement from a

protracted civil war state through transitional governments, NGOs, and international institutions, collaborating by stabilizing the conflict's political, economic, military, and social structures downtrodden. This resolution implies that development is imperative in the post-conflict state transition to democratic and equitable distribution of resources for its public welfare. The scholars also illustrate that development theories gradually started with modernization, dependency, world systems, and globalization. These theories of development trends went through voluminous concepts of linear progress over time, which dominated geopolitical alliance and international multilateral relations regionally and globally, as explained through the efforts of industrialization, urbanization, and socio-economic infrastructures.

To conclude the discussion on the empirical data finding, the study's low empirical and statistical findings on service delivery demonstrate the urgency for retooling and resourcing support in South Sudan's post-political transition. Therefore, retooling and resourcing service delivery and innovation need strategies such as capacity, governance, materials—physical infrastructural installations, security, and stability to improve ineffectual performance. The study findings explicitly define the correlations of each objective. The research evaluates the effectiveness of capacity, political stability, incorporation of governance principles, and reliability of service delivery, and installation of physical infrastructures.

The interrelations among the variables are defined based on the actors involved in delivering and innovating services and tools employed by the actors. For instance, capacity is the fortification of knowledge and skills, abilities and competencies applied by the individual actors involved in delivering services. These fortified applications need tools or strategies to implement the innovation and delivery of services. The inference implies that governance principles need to guide decision-making and process. The innovation of services needs secure, stable and safe transitional security arrangements. The actors need infrastructural facilities to operate in. The empirical findings suggest that correlations, in terms of the surveyed outcomes, are interrelated; especially political stability and governance are tandems to all other indicators in the study.

4.3. Policy Gaps and Implications

As demonstrated through the discussion section, data finding and analysis chapter, the research policy gaps and implications resulting in the ineffectual performance in delivering and innovating services are revealed. For instance, the lack of investment in sound policies has exacerbated the drivers of implementing the post-political transition.

Nonetheless, the empirical statistics indicate varying outcomes with high disapproval of the performance of post-political transitions and provision of services attached to the peace agreement transitional arrangements. The policy gaps and implications were discovered through the unprecedented impact of state instability on service innovation during the transitional arrangements. The implications

of these gaps include the following:

1) The lack of capacity to deliver and innovate services in rural areas widened the gap between urban and rural services. Rural areas are affected by insecurity and lack of skilled human resources because many have fled and found employment opportunities in urban centres.

2) The transitional arrangements were harmed by the pervasive fractionalization and fragmentation of the political elites in the peace implementation. The factionalized and fragmented politics affected robust, reconcilable, and stable government functionality. Transitional arrangements only contextualized elites-to-elites' political settlements. For instance, elites-to-elites political arrangements look up to the power, opportunities, and resources control at the expense of grassroots while leaving grassroots service delivery oriented dividends untended.

3) The exclusivity of sound governance principles failed to be observed as benchmark indicators of implementing the R-ARCSS. These infringements caused concerns and issues related to governance and delayed permanent constitution-making processes.

4) Lack of adhering to a strict smooth political transition and governance principles has a causal impact on the delivery of quality services.

5) The neglect of development regarding reconstructing and recovering physical infrastructural facilities such as schools, health centres, roads, and many more have been implicated due to non-support initiatives from the post-transitional government.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The study evaluates capacity, political transitions, governance, and infrastructural installation to post-conflict service delivery and innovation. According to the empirical outcomes, the study findings produced low approvals regarding services provided during the post-conflict era. The dysfunctional performance revealed by the research findings supports the literature on South Sudan's post-conflict reconstruction and recovery. The study explicitly illustrates a true embodiment and revelation on the issues of post-conflict ineffectual performances. The revelation demonstrates the need for more service delivery and innovation in the Republic of South Sudan on service development initiatives. The deficiency has encouraged conduits of poverty-stricken-community and violent states. As a result, the factionalized and fragmented politics have polarized the state on ethnicities line and perpetuated ethnographic conflict on a communal basis.

In conclusion, the study on the impact of state instability on service delivery and innovation explicitly conveys the empirical deficiencies in government performance in the post-political transition. The empirical shreds of evidence unearthed fragmentations and ineffectiveness of post-conflict transition for services delivery. These fragmentations and ineffectiveness of delivering services have far-reaching consequences on deontological morality with abdicated governance accountability. The specificity impact of state instability has been confirmed by the

variable data outcomes exhibiting low performance and deliverability. Therefore, the study reveals its conformity to the current situation South Sudan is going through, the turbulence of a fragmented state of political fragility, resulting in the inability to have an adequate capacity to innovate and deliver services, recognizable legitimacy, and enshrined authority to governance.

5.1. Recommendations

As discussion and policy gaps implications and empirical statistics have exhibited predicaments that South Sudan state instability has caused to the delivery of services, it is imperative that the research provide the following policy recommendations to address the gaps:

1) The Enhancement of Institutionalism Rubrics

The hallmark of enhanced institutionalism in a post-conflict and fragile state provides an elaborated system of governance and institutional functions. These hallmarks build a fragile state recovering from a state instability by improving the functional performance and capacity to deliver on governance benchmarks.

The institutionalism rubrics should be laid out at the onset of setting up post-conflict transitory arrangements as procedures and operating standards built on the legal framework, institutional development and management efficiency, human capital, public accountability, and institutional sustainability. Each rubric has its importance to the function of the institution. While the latest empirical analysis indicates low outcomes on institutionalism development during post-conflict, the study recommends improving institutional development using the organizational functions.

Therefore, a fragile state must adapt to the new operation guided by rule of law and policies governing the state or institution. An enhanced institution defines the guidelines with segregated responsibilities and efficiencies to address gaps and predicaments in the institution. This recommendation pursues the principles of governance, which are the cushions of building a resilient political transition.

2) Instrumentalization of Capacity Performances and Functions

The institution's capacity, performance, and function are defined by the fortified knowledge, skills, and abilities of individuals or professionals assigned to execute various organizational operations. The employment and employability of human resources competence-based assessment and deployment must guide these organizational operations. Addressing the challenges revealed by the study, the study recommends the employment and deployment of human resources on the following criteria:

a) **The proportionality deployment criteria** are intervention approaches for delivering high-quality achievement from the deployment of specialized skilled professionals in the desired field of designation. This criterion is adaptable and resilient to fairness and equity in human capital deployment.

b) **The principality deployment criteria** are intervention approaches where policy practitioners are assigned to deliver services with blended social capital em-

phasizing public accountability; it induces high-quality performance because the elites are directly accountable to service recipients.

c) **The predictability criteria** are intervention approaches that utilize Strength Weakness Opportunity Threat (SWOT) analysis to predict or foretell where an institution will adjust its performance by foreseeing the capacity to deliver service from the past-present-future paradigm.

d) **The possession criteria** are intervention approaches for ownership and innovation, building from your skills and knowledge based on prevailing tasks.

e) **The policy balkanization criterion** is an interventional approach where legal frameworks are segregated according to institutional functions, the division of responsibilities based on arms of governance and individual specialization.

3) **Re-Enforcement and Re-Enhancement of Post-Political Transitioning Social Cohesions**

Social cohesions are imperative tradeoffs applied as cushions to facilitate post-political transitioning implementations. Re-enforcing and re-enhancing post-conflict institutions through social cohesions by applying cushioning strategies such as enhancing trust-building, strengthening security reforms, incentivizing development dividends, adhering to governance principles, promoting non-patrimonialism alliance, and re-engendering civic engagement is the basis of institutional strength and governance.

Therefore, social cohesion as a tool for enhancing the interaction of individuals and communities within the institution is paramount. Social cohesion continues to improve the engagement of post-conflict principals during the transitional political arrangements. The elites involved in governing and implementing post-conflict fragile peace build bridges and continue to improve the completeness and purity of handling the state's service delivery and innovation issues.

Social cohesion lays a solid foundation of peace-building, trust-building, and social resilience with its social dimensions, resulting in sustainable resilience system of governance (Fonseca & Almeida, 2015). The study's empirical statistics reveal that issues of political and security transitions are due to a lack of utilizing social cohesion strategies at the governance levels.

4) **Governance Monitoring and Feedback Loops**

The inception of the CPA 2005 implementation introduced decentralization of governance. The decentralized governance was viewed as an excellent strategy to innovate and deliver service to the impoverished citizens denied development opportunities in 22 years of civil war in Southern regions. However, the emergency of the 2013 crisis created linkage barriers in the context of a decentralized governance system. These barriers discouraged intractability between the Government and citizens' communication due to instability and fragile security.

The fragility widened the gap between the citizens and their Government on peace agreement such as CPA, 2005 and R-ARCSS-2018. Therefore, the state and institution need to safeguard connections and interdependencies as comprehensive governance monitoring and feedback tools. The Government needs to im-

prove governance monitoring feedback loops that will enhance participatory democracy and social accountability from bottom-up to top-down interactions by allowing local authorities to digitize monitoring and public accountability management.

The empirical statistics show high disapproval of the decentralization and lack of monitoring of the post-political transitioning service delivery at local context levels. Therefore, providing a monitoring and feedback mechanism will reduce communication gaps and limit public accountability barriers.

5) Bottom-up Infrastructural Service Delivery Oriented

Infrastructural service facilities are crucial means of delivering and innovating development to the most conflict-affected services provision. However, the fragility context inhibits the safe environment for delivering or innovating services.

The study explicitly demonstrates that post-conflict service deliveries are prone to fragility and fluidity of conflict occurrences, which affect the effectiveness of delivering services. The research recommends the development of the following service-oriented plans:

a) Rural-to-rural development creates services that meet the local context demand during the post-conflict period. This rural-to-rural service-oriented system will create enabling development opportunities, which may reduce the fragility or return to a violent state. The development opportunities are indicators of good governance and political stability.

b) Urban-to-rural services create services from urban centres that will bridge the need of rural development. The urban service-oriented services act like continuous quality improvement bridges for rural-to-rural service delivery oriented.

c) Incremental and radical innovation create services that can be replicated with rapid development levels in urban to rural development perspectives.

d) Ownership-based approach encourages the possession of services built or created at the local context levels. The local owners design services they can own and develop themselves further.

6) The Politburo's Elites-to-Elites: Adaptability, Flexibility, and Inducibility in Post-Political Transitions

The post-political transitions internalized peace agreements and implementations are hindered by the conflict of interests among the power-sharing politburo elites. This hindrance always distorts the strength of post-conflict governance while weakening the implementation mode agreed by the participatory politburo partners.

During the post-political transition, the basis of the power-sharing agreement mode deployed is always elites-to-elites. This deployment of elites-to-elites causes elicitable entities to their politburo. The deployed elites-to-elites encourage the fragmented and fictionalized service delivery due to conflict of interest among the peace partners. Therefore, the research recommends that elites' politburo should be:

a) Adaptable: The elites should modify for any anticipatory circumstantiated

events in the post-political settlement while discouraging power control and resource distribution mechanisms and instead to promote public interest equity.

b) Flexible: The elites should introduce a capable system resilient to issues restricting smooth transitory parameters by devising strategies for coping with unexpected circumstances.

c) Inducible: The elites should encourage compromises based on persuasion and collective responsibilities. The strategy introduces a culture of positive influence and social cohesion, the intractability of elites-to-elites solid political stability and post-transitions.

5.2. Further Research

- 1) A study on post-conflict political transition models that suit bottom-up services-oriented delivery.
- 2) An investigation into the typical model of the ethnically polarized state.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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