


Revisiting the State of War: A Critique of Hobbesian Premises through the Lenses of Game Theory and Evolutionary Biology

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Abstract

The “state of war” proposed by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* is examined, with emphasis on the extreme scenarios he posits and their potential social consequences. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove game, and the Stag Hunt as analytical lenses, the limits of Hobbesian assumptions are evaluated in light of modern evolutionary theory and game theory, including insights on kin selection, reciprocity, reputation, and multi-level selection. Paradoxical reasoning in Hobbes’s treatment of rationality, including the second-order free-rider problem, is identified, indicating a lack of internal consistency under specified premises. The role of extreme baseline assumptions in biasing inference about cooperation, social order, and authority is clarified, and testable propositions are articulated to distinguish Hobbesian predictions from evolutionary models of cooperation. The analysis culminates in a revised understanding of the state as a form of cultural scaffolding for pre-existing cooperative instincts, rather than a *de novo* creator of social order. Finally, the trade-off between theoretical comprehensiveness and analytical incisiveness is assessed, and avenues for integrating mechanism-based explanations with normative analysis for an empirically responsible political philosophy are outlined.

Keywords

Hobbes, State of War, Game Theory, Biological Altruism, Evolutionary Biology, Free-Rider Problem

1. Introduction

Thomas Hobbes’s concept of the “state of war” stands as a monumental and terrifying edifice in the landscape of Western political philosophy. Conceived amidst the brutal chaos of the English Civil War (1642-1651), a conflict that tore the na-

tion apart and saw the execution of a king, Leviathan is far more than a mere academic exercise. It is a desperate and profound attempt to diagnose the fundamental causes of human conflict from the perspective of a man who had witnessed the complete breakdown of social and political order. Hobbes's central argument is as stark as it is influential: that in a state of nature, an anarchic condition devoid of a common power to "keep them all in awe," humanity is inexorably drawn into a "war of every man against every man" (Hobbes, 1651). This condition, driven by rational self-interest and primal passions, makes life "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." The only conceivable escape, Hobbes argues, is an act of collective surrender: the establishment of an absolute sovereign—the Leviathan—which, through its monopoly on force, creates the possibility of peace, industry, and civilization.

The power of Hobbes's argument lies in its chilling logical parsimony. It serves as the foundational text for political realism—profoundly influencing theories of international relations from Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Waltz—and has defined the terms of the social contract debate for nearly four centuries. Yet, its entire intellectual weight rests upon a specific and highly contestable set of axioms about human nature and the dynamics of social interaction. The Hobbesian individual is an atomized, pre-social entity, for whom rationality is a narrow, instrumental calculus focused on immediate, individualistic utility maximization—a model akin to the *homo economicus* of classical economics. It is this foundational model of the human agent that this paper seeks to systematically deconstruct and challenge. We contend that these Hobbesian premises, while powerful in their simplicity, are fundamentally incompatible with the deep insights provided by modern evolutionary biology and the formal logic of game theory.

This essay will conduct a multi-layered critique of the Hobbesian state of war, embarking on a theoretical journey from Hobbes's own text to the frontiers of modern science. Part One will begin with a deep dive into the architecture of Hobbes's argument, meticulously deconstructing the three principal causes of war—Competition, Diffidence, and Glory—and engaging with prominent philosophical critiques that question the argument's internal coherence. Part Two will then deploy the formal apparatus of game theory to test Hobbes's strategic claims. Using the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove game, and the Stag Hunt, we will demonstrate that universal conflict is not the only, or even the most likely, rational outcome in anarchic systems, and that cooperative strategies can emerge spontaneously. Part Three will broaden the critique by turning to the field of evolutionary biology. Here, we will introduce a cascade of explanatory mechanisms—from the foundational concept of kin selection, to reciprocal altruism, to the power of indirect reciprocity and reputation, and finally to the controversial but powerful theory of multi-level selection. This section will also expose a fatal paradox at the heart of Hobbes's proposed solution: the intractable first and second-order free-rider problems inherent in the creation of the Leviathan itself.

Finally, in the synthesis and conclusion, we will argue for a new understanding

of social order. Rather than viewing the state as the creator of order from a void of asocial chaos, we will reframe it as a form of cultural scaffolding that builds upon and extends our evolved, small-group morality to the vast, anonymous scale of modern society.

2. The Architecture of Anarchy: A Deep Dive into the Hobbesian State of War

To critique Hobbes, one must first appreciate the formidable structure of his argument. His descent into the state of war is not an arbitrary assertion but a logical deduction from a set of clear first principles concerning human nature.

2.1. The Foundations: Natural Equality and the Pursuit of Felicity

Hobbes begins not with sin or inherent evil, but with a simple observation of natural equality. It is crucial to note that many scholars interpret this “state of nature” not as a literal anthropological claim about a pre-historical epoch, but as a purely logical thought experiment. From this perspective, the state of nature is an abstraction designed to reveal the necessary foundations of political order by imagining its absence, thereby strengthening the critique by engaging with its philosophical purpose rather than its historical accuracy. From this abstract premise of equality, this is not a normative claim about moral worth, but a starkly practical assessment of human capacity. “Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind,” he writes, “as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he” (Hobbes, 1651). Critically, this includes an equality in the ability to kill one another, as “the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by confederacy with others.” This parity in vulnerability is the seed of all subsequent trouble.

This equality is coupled with a restless, insatiable engine of human motivation: the pursuit of “felicity.” For Hobbes, felicity is not a tranquil state of satisfaction but a “continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter” (Hobbes, 1651). Man is a creature of perpetual striving, whose desires cease only in death. When two or more of these roughly equal, perpetually striving beings desire the same finite object—be it a resource, a position of power, or another person’s submission—they inevitably become enemies.

2.2. The Three Principal Causes of Quarrel

From this foundation of equality and desire, Hobbes deduces three principal causes of conflict that make the state of nature a state of war.

2.2.1. Competition

The first driver is competition for material gain. Because resources are scarce and

desires are limitless, individuals are in a constant state of potential conflict over possessions, territory, and sustenance. “If any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end... endeavour to destroy or subdue one another” (Hobbes, 1651). This is a straightforward logic of resource conflict, a zero-sum game for survival and advantage that is familiar in both the human and animal worlds.

2.2.2. Diffidence (Distrust)

More pernicious and uniquely Hobbesian is the logic of diffidence, or deep-seated distrust. In the absence of a common power, there is no security. No one can be sure of anyone else’s intentions. Even if an individual is peacefully inclined, they cannot assume the same of others. This pervasive uncertainty creates a powerful, rational incentive for pre-emptive action. Hobbes calls this “anticipation”: “...there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him” (Hobbes, 1651). This is the essence of the security dilemma, familiar to international relations theory: measures taken by one actor to increase their own security are perceived as threatening by others, who then take their own security measures, leading to an escalatory spiral of conflict. In the Hobbesian state of nature, rationality itself dictates aggression as the only viable defense.

2.2.3. Glory

The final cause is the most psychological and arguably the most human: the quest for “glory,” or reputation. Humans are not just concerned with material survival; they are intensely sensitive to their social standing. They crave recognition and abhor signs of contempt or “undervaluing.” “Every man expects that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself,” Hobbes notes, and upon any “sign of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavors, as far as he dares... to extort a greater value from his contemners, by damage; and from others, by the example” (Hobbes, 1651). This makes conflict not just a matter of resources or security, but of honor, pride, and status. As Abizadeh (2011) argues, this psychological “prickliness” can lend an ideological and passionate fire to conflict, making it erupt over trifles and perceived insults, thus transcending cold, rational calculation.

2.3. Internal Critiques of the Hobbesian Logic

Before even introducing external scientific frameworks, philosophers have identified significant strains in the internal logic of Hobbes’s argument. Kavka (1986), for example, conducts a detailed analysis and argues that Hobbes overstates the rationality of pre-emptive strikes. Given the catastrophic risks of failure in an attack, forming “defensive coalitions” with like-minded others would be a far more rational strategy. While Hobbes would counter that such pacts, being mere “covenants of words,” are unenforceable, Kavka retorts that self-interested individuals

would be motivated to uphold them to build a reputation for trustworthiness, which is itself a valuable asset for future beneficial cooperation. This critique astutely points out that Hobbes neglects the instrumental value of reputation, a theme we will see amplified in later sections.

Hampton (1986), in her book *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*, famously argued that Hobbes's description of the state of nature is a "failed" game theory argument. She contends that Hobbes is fatally inconsistent about whether the conflict is driven by short-sighted, "fiery" passions or by far-sighted reason. If the war is driven by myopic passions, then the problem is not a lack of sovereignty but a lack of individual self-control, and the Leviathan would be an ineffective solution. If, however, it is driven by far-sighted reason, as the logic of diffidence suggests, then these same rational actors should be able to perceive the mutually destructive nature of their predicament and devise a way out without an absolute sovereign, through agreements and conventions. This exposes a fundamental tension in Hobbes's account of human motivation that makes his descent into war less of a logical necessity and more of a contingent outcome.

3. Modeling the Void: A Game Theoretic Deconstruction

Game theory provides a formal language to rigorously test the strategic logic that underpins the Hobbesian state of war. It allows us to move beyond intuition and analyze whether the behaviors Hobbes describes are, in fact, the most rational choices for individuals in an anarchic setting.

3.1. The Prisoner's Dilemma as the Hobbesian Trap

The Prisoner's Dilemma is the quintessential model of the problem Hobbes identifies, particularly the logic of diffidence. In its classic formulation, where $T > R > P > S$, the logic for a rational, self-interested individual in a one-shot game is inescapable. From Player 1's perspective: "If Player 2 stays silent (Cooperates), my best move is to betray them and go free ($T > R$). If Player 2 betrays me (Defects), my best move is still to betray them to avoid the sucker's payoff ($P > S$)." Therefore, regardless of the other player's action, betraying them (Defecting) is the dominant strategy. Since both players reason this way, they end up in the state of mutual defection (P, P), a Pareto-suboptimal outcome. This is a perfect formalization of the Hobbesian trap: a situation where individual rationality leads to collective irrationality and a state of mutual antagonism.

3.2. Escaping the Trap: The Iterated Game and the "Shadow of the Future"

The crucial flaw in applying this model to human society is that social life is not a one-shot game. We interact with the same people repeatedly. This is the domain of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and it changes everything. The key variable is the "shadow of the future" (or the discount factor)—the weight we place on future payoffs relative to immediate ones. If interactions are ongoing and the future is

sufficiently valued, a player's actions in one round affect their opponent's actions in future rounds, opening the door for trust and reciprocity.

In this iterated context, Robert Axelrod's famous computer tournament found that simple, reciprocal strategies like Tit-for-Tat (TFT) could outcompete more aggressive or complex ones (Axelrod, 1984). Its success was due to a combination of being nice (never the first to defect), retaliatory (immediately punishing defection), forgiving (willing to restore cooperation), and clear (its simplicity made it easy to recognize). The triumph of these strategies demonstrates that cooperation based on reciprocity can emerge and thrive without any central authority. However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this model: its success hinges on specific conditions, namely a high probability of future interactions and the cognitive capacity to reliably identify individuals and remember the history of their actions. Where interactions are anonymous or fleeting, the strategic logic of Tit-for-Tat weakens, a point that echoes Hobbes's concerns in the context of a larger, less stable society.

3.3. Beyond Temptation: The Stag Hunt and the Problem of Assurance

While the Prisoner's Dilemma models the problem of temptation (the temptation to defect for a higher payoff), another crucial game, the Stag Hunt, models the problem of assurance. As conceptualized by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the story involves two hunters who can choose to either cooperate to hunt a stag (a large, shared reward) or individually hunt a hare (a smaller, but guaranteed, individual reward). The payoff structure might be:

Stag, Stag (Cooperate, Cooperate): 4, 4

Stag, Hare (Cooperate, Defect): 0, 3

Hare, Stag (Defect, Cooperate): 3, 0

Hare, Hare (Defect, Defect): 3, 3

Here, unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma, there is no incentive to defect if you believe your partner will cooperate ($4 > 3$). Mutual cooperation is the best outcome for everyone. The problem is the risk of your partner's choice. If you choose to hunt the stag but your partner, fearing you will abandon the hunt, goes for the guaranteed hare, you end up with nothing. The dilemma is one of trust and coordination, not betrayal. The Stag Hunt highlights that even when all parties share a common interest in cooperation, it can fail due to a lack of mutual assurance. This underscores the critical importance of trust-building mechanisms, communication, and shared norms—social technologies that Hobbes largely ignores but that are central to real human sociality (Skyrms, 2004).

3.4. Limited Conflict: The Hawk-Dove Game

Finally, the Hawk-Dove game models conflicts over a divisible resource. Its key insight, as explored by John Maynard Smith, is that when the cost of injury (C) outweighs the value of the resource (V), a population of pure aggressors ("Hawks") is evolutionarily unstable (Smith, 1982). The relentless conflict of a "war of all against

all” is a self-defeating strategy because the average payoff for a Hawk in a population of Hawks, $(V-C)/2$, is negative. The stable outcome (the ESS) is a mixture of aggressive and peaceful strategies. This leads to a state of limited, often ritualized conflict, not the total, unceasing war Hobbes envisioned.

4. The Biological Imperative: The Evolutionary Roots of Social Order

If game theory reveals the strategic flaws in Hobbes’s argument, evolutionary biology demolishes its psychological and anthropological foundations. The Hobbesian “natural man”—solitary, atomized, and purely self-interested—is a philosophical abstraction that bears little resemblance to the social animal that 200,000 years of hominid evolution have produced.

4.1. The Gene’s View: W.D. Hamilton and Kin Selection

The revolution in modern evolutionary theory began with W.D. Hamilton’s concept of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964). Hamilton’s Rule provides the elegant solution to the puzzle of altruism:

$$rB > C \quad (1)$$

In Equation (1), I adopt the now-standard formulation of Hamilton’s rule: a gene for altruism can spread if the fitness cost (C) to the altruist is less than the fitness benefit (B) to the recipient, weighted by their coefficient of relatedness (r)¹. This logic reframes the concept of “self-interest”: the relevant unit of interest lies is the gene’s own replication, whether in its current host body or in the body of a relative. This principle fundamentally redraws Hobbes’s state of nature. It would not be a war of “every man against every man” but a world structured by nepotistic alliances. The primary form of social organization would be the kin group, within which powerful bonds of cooperation, loyalty, and self-sacrifice would be the norm. Hobbes’s crucial premise that natural life is “solitary” is biologically untenable. We are social from the very beginning. However, it must be noted that kin selection is a double-edged sword: while it explains intra-group harmony, it also provides a powerful explanation for inter-group conflict, xenophobia, and racism—ingroup love and outgroup hate are two sides of the same coin.

4.2. Reciprocal Altruism and Its Cognitive Machinery

To explain cooperation among non-relatives, Trivers (1971) developed the theory of reciprocal altruism, the biological analogue of the Tit-for-Tat strategy. This system can evolve under specific conditions of repeated interaction and cognitive capacity. Critically, evolutionary psychologists like Cosmides and Tooby (1992)

¹Hamilton did not use the exact symbolic form $rB > C$ in his original articles. The inequality is a later standard notation that summarizes the condition developed in Hamilton (1964), “The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I & II”, *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 7, 1-52. See especially Part II, p. 18: “more than $1/r$ units of reproductive potential or ‘fitness’ must be endowed on a relative of degree r for every one unit lost by the altruist...”.

have proposed that the human brain evolved specialized cognitive modules for navigating these social exchanges, including a highly efficient “cheater detection mechanism.” Humans appear to be far better at solving logical problems when they are framed as the detection of social contract violations than when they are presented as abstract puzzles. This suggests that our very reasoning processes have been shaped by the selective pressures of reciprocal exchange. A suite of human emotions, from gratitude and guilt to moralistic aggression, can also be understood as evolved mechanisms for managing these reciprocal relationships, acting as commitment devices that enforce cooperative behavior (Frank, 1988).

4.3. Indirect Reciprocity and the Power of Reputation

In large-scale societies, direct reciprocity is insufficient. This is where indirect reciprocity comes into play, a mechanism powerfully articulated by biologists like Martin Nowak (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). The logic is “I help you because doing so earns me a good reputation, and someone else will help me later.” In this system, reputation becomes a central currency of social life. This provides a powerful evolutionary link to Hobbes’s third cause of war: glory. While Hobbes viewed the pursuit of glory (reputation) as a source of conflict over status and “trifles” (Hobbes, 1651), this evolutionary perspective reframes it. The same deep-seated psychological drive for status and a positive reputation is also the primary engine of large-scale cooperation among non-kin. The desire to be seen as a valuable, cooperative member of the group—to have good “glory”—incentivizes pro-social behavior far more effectively than the threat of immediate violence. Thus, the passion Hobbes identified as a key driver of war is, from a biological standpoint, also the foundation of our most expansive forms of peace. The evolution of human language, as argued by primatologist Dunbar (1996), was crucial for this. He proposed that language evolved as a form of “social grooming,” allowing information about who is a cooperator and who is a cheater to be rapidly disseminated throughout a social network. Gossip, far from being a trivial pastime, is a vital mechanism for social policing, creating a “social ledger” that holds individuals accountable for their actions and allowing cooperation to scale up far beyond the limits of personal interaction.

4.4. The Cooperative Species: Multi-Level Selection Theory

A further, and more holistic, evolutionary framework is multi-level (or group) selection theory. While controversial, this theory, championed by Wilson and Sober (1994), proposes that natural selection operates on multiple levels simultaneously: on genes, on individuals, and on groups. The core insight is summarized by the phrase: “Selfishness beats altruism within groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups.” While selfish individuals might outcompete their more cooperative neighbors within their own group, groups composed of many cooperators will be more effective at everything from hunting and child-rearing to warfare. These successful groups will grow, thrive, and replace groups composed of selfish individuals.

This process could have selected for a suite of “group-minded” psychological traits, including conformity, ethnocentrism, and a genuine capacity for altruism toward ingroup members. If this theory holds, then Hobbes’s premise of the purely individualistic human is not just wrong, but diametrically opposed to the forces that shaped our species. It is crucial to add a note of scientific caution, however: multi-level selection remains a subject of vigorous debate among evolutionary biologists, with many arguing that selection operating at the level of genes and individuals (kin selection and reciprocity) is sufficient to explain the evolution of cooperation. Nonetheless, its inclusion highlights the breadth of biological theories that challenge the Hobbesian starting point.

4.5. The Achilles’ Heel: Hobbes and the Compounded Free-Rider Paradox

The combined power of these evolutionary mechanisms for cooperation exposes the most devastating flaw in Hobbes’s entire project: the free-rider paradox inherent in the creation of the Leviathan. As we have noted, the state is a public good, and rational Hobbesian agents would prefer to let others bear the costs of its creation (Olson, 1965). But the problem is even deeper. It includes the second-order free-rider problem. Even if a group agrees that free-riders must be punished, punishment itself is often costly. Who will bear the cost of punishing the free-riders? A rational individual would prefer that someone else do the punishing. This leads to a situation where everyone agrees punishment is necessary, but no one is willing to carry it out. The entire system of enforcement, which Hobbes takes for granted as the solution, is itself a public good that is radically difficult to produce. The Leviathan cannot get off the ground because the very individuals it is meant to govern are, by Hobbes’s own definition, incapable of solving the nested collective action problems its creation requires.

5. Synthesis and a New Foundation for Political Theory

5.1. From Biology to Strategy: An Integrated Model of Human Sociality

The insights from game theory and evolutionary biology are not separate critiques; they are deeply intertwined. Biology provides the evolved “wetware” or psychological programming that predisposes human beings to adopt the successful strategies identified by game theory. We can visualize this as a layered model of human cooperation:

Layer 1 (Core): Kin Selection. This is the bedrock of cooperation, creating a reliable foundation of trust within families.

Layer 2 (Dyads): Direct Reciprocity. Built upon the cognitive machinery for memory and cheater detection, this layer enables Tit-for-Tat-like strategies in repeated interactions.

Layer 3 (Communities): Indirect Reciprocity. Scaled up by language and the psychology of reputation, it allows for cooperation in larger groups where gossip

can police behavior.

Layer 4 (Groups): Multi-level Selection. Potentially acting on all groups, favoring those with cultural norms and institutions that promote internal cooperation and outcompete other groups.

This integrated model paints a picture of a “natural” human who is a conditional and tribal cooperator, equipped with a sophisticated, multi-layered toolkit for navigating complex social landscapes.

5.2. The Problem of Scale and the True Role of the Leviathan

This does not mean Hobbes was entirely wrong. He was wrong about the starting point, but he was profoundly right about the problem of scale. The evolved mechanisms for cooperation work magnificently in the small, tight-knit, face-to-face groups that characterized most of human history (Dunbar, 1996). When human societies exploded in size with the advent of agriculture and cities, they entered a new and dangerous phase. In a world of thousands or millions of anonymous individuals, the traditional mechanisms of social control—kinship, direct reciprocity, and reputational gossip—begin to fail.

Viewed in this light, the Leviathan—the formal state with its laws, courts, and police—is not a replacement for our nature, but a scaffolding for it. It is a form of cultural evolution, an invention designed to solve the problem of anonymity.

1) Formal laws mimic the rules of reciprocity but make them explicit and universal.

2) Police and courts are institutionalized, impartial forms of third-party punishment, solving the second-order free-rider problem by professionalizing the role of punisher.

3) National identity, flags, and anthems are cultural technologies designed to create “fictive kinship,” attempting to co-opt our powerful kin-selection and group-selection instincts. They serve to construct what Benedict Anderson famously termed an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1983), where individuals who will never meet develop a sense of shared identity and destiny, applying small-group psychology to a nation of millions of strangers.

The state, therefore, did not create order from chaos. It co-opted, formalized, and scaled up the pro-social instincts that evolution had already given us, allowing them to function in a demographic environment for which they were not originally designed (Henrich, 2016).

6. Conclusion

The Hobbesian state of war remains a masterpiece of political philosophy, a chillingly logical exploration of the dark possibilities of human interaction. Its power is a testament to what can be deduced from a narrow, parsimonious set of premises. Yet, its very foundation—the premise of an asocial, atomized, and myopically rational individual—is, in the light of over a century of scientific advancement, a philosophical fiction.

This essay has demonstrated that the Hobbesian system faces a dual, and ultimately fatal, challenge. From within, its strategic logic is questionable; game theory reveals that conditional cooperation, coordination, and limited conflict are more stable and likely outcomes in anarchy than a perpetual war of all against all. From without, its anthropological premise is demonstrably false; evolutionary biology in its multiple forms reveals that we are a species endowed with deep, layered instincts for kin-based altruism, reciprocity, reputation management, and group solidarity.

Furthermore, we have shown that Hobbes's own proposed solution, the creation of the Leviathan, is paradoxically undermined by his own premises. The nested collective action problems involved in forging a social contract are insurmountable for the very free-riding agents he describes. The state could only have been formed by individuals already capable of the trust, cooperation, and norm enforcement that Hobbes believed only the state could create.

The ultimate contribution of this synthesis is not to discard Hobbes, but to situate him correctly. He provided an unforgettable account of what can happen when our evolved social instincts are overwhelmed by the novel problem of mass anonymity. The revised understanding offered here is that the relationship between human nature and political order is not one of opposition, but of co-evolution. We were not born into a state of inevitable conflict, needing a sovereign to save us from ourselves. We were born with a dual potential for both conflict and cooperation, equipped by evolution with a sophisticated, if limited, toolkit for social life. The great project of civilization has not been to escape our nature, but to build upon it. Acknowledging this co-evolutionary dynamic has profound practical implications, suggesting that contemporary challenges, from fostering international cooperation to mitigating online polarization, require not just top-down decrees but the careful design of institutional 'scaffolding' that leverages our innate social instincts in these new, scaled-up environments.

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